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8 Export Promotion and 
Employment Growth 
in South Korea 
Wontack Hong 
Introduction 
The phenomenal growth Korea has achieved over the past two decades 
is by now well known1 Korea’s growth rate has exceeded that of any 
other country in the world. Growth was based upon an export promo- 
tion strategy that resulted in an average annual growth rate of the 
dollar value of exports of more than 40 percent annually even before the 
worldwide inflation of the mid-1970s. Exports have continued to grow 
rapidly in real terms even since that time. 
The rapid growth of real GNP has transformed the Korean economy, 
and many other policies were changed in addition to trade policy. 
Among the results of the transformation has been the virtual elimina- 
tion of open unemployment and a rapid rise in the real wage. 
Korea’s success has stimulated a great deal of interest on the part of 
other countries in the policies she followed and their results. Although 
the rapid growth of trade and its effects on GNP have been closely 
studied (see Frank, Kim, and Westphal 1975; Westphal and Kim 1977), 
less attention has been devoted to an assessment of the relationship be- 
tween Korea’s choice of an export-oriented trade strategy and the rapid 
rate of growth of urban employment and real wages. Because of that gap, 
this examination of Korea’s commodity composition of trade and its re- 
lationship with employment should be of great interest. 
Focus in this study is upon 1970, a year for which data are readily 
available. By 1970 the export-oriented growth strategy had been in ef- 
fect for ten years. Real wages were rising rapidly, and the rapid accumu- 
lation of capital implied that Korean factor endowments were beginning 
to change. I therefore examine not only the pattern of trade in 1970, 
but also the way it evolved over time. During the 1970s, Korean policy 
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began to shift toward the encouragement of capital-intensive industries. 
A final focus of this paper is upon those policies, and upon their com- 
patability with the continued success of an export-oriented growth 
strategy in Korea. 
8.1 Major Characteristics of the Korean Economy 
8.1.1 Growth and Structure 
Table 8.1 gives salient data on the growth and structure of the Korean 
economy. In the early 1950s Korea was one of the poorest countries 
in the world, with a very high population density and a per capita income 
of only $240 measured in 1977 prices. There was little manufacturing 
activity, reflecting both the underdeveloped state of the economy and 
the aftereffects of the Korean War. Exports were almost nonexistent and 
consisted primarily of agricultural commodities (see table 8.2). 
After the devastation of the war, Korea pursued inward-looking poli- 
cies. Throughout the 1950s it had most of the characteristics of an 
import substitution, relatively slow growth economy. The exchange rate 
was overvalued, and numerous direct controls were applied to interna- 
tional transactions. Aid inflows were sizable, since foreign-exchange 
earnings failed to cover more than a small part of the import bill. 
By the late 1950s it was evident to all that aid flows would not be 
sustained and that Korea, dependent on imports for most raw materials, 
could not grow satisfactorily through further import substitution. In the 
early 1960s, policy signals were reversed, starting with a large devalu- 
ation in 1960, followed by a program of export incentives that main- 
tained the real exchange rate for exports despite fairly rapid domestic 
inflation (see section 8.1.2). The switch to an export promotion strategy 
was followed by rapid increases in exports: from 1962 to 1972, exports 
rose from 2 to 18 percent of GNP, while per capita income rose from 
$275 to $541 in 1977 prices. Per capita income growth has continued 
to be rapid and is estimated to have been $864 in 1977. Over the period 
1962 to 1977, per capita GNP rose at an average annual rate of nearly 
8 percent. Government development programs and investment and 
credit policies were largely concentrated on export promotion, although 
that concentration necessarily implied attention to infrastructure for 
ports, transport, communications, and other facilities necessary for the 
success of the export promotion drive. 
The switch in incentives in the trade sector was accompanied in 
1964-65 by a very significant set of monetary and fiscal reforms, which 
raised the nominal interest rate and lowered the inflation rate signifi- 
cantly. For this and other reasons, the domestic savings rate rose rapidly. 
This was absolutely essential, since the inflow of United States aid, 
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Table 8.1 Growth and Changes in Industrial Slructure, 1953-77 
1953 1957 1962 1967 1972 19778 
Industries (percentage 
distribution of 
value added) 
Agriculture and forestry 
Fishery 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, water and 
sanitation 
Transportation and 
communications 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Banking and other services 
Education and public 
Ownership of dwellings 
administration 
46 42 39 32 23 16 
2 2 2 2 2 3 
1 1 2 1 1 1 
6 9 12 17 25 35 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
2 2 3 5 6 7 
2 2 3 4 5 6 
11 13 15 15 18 17 
8 8 9 8 8 6 
17 14 12 10 8 5 
5 4 4 3 2 2 
GNP (in billions of 1977 $) 5.0 6.1 7.3 11.2 18.0 31.5 
PercapitaGNP (in 1977$) 240 266 275 368 541 864 
Commodity exports/GNPb 1 1 2 7 18 33 
Commodity imports/GNPb 10 11 16 21 25 35  
Trade (in billions of current $) 
Commodity imports 0.35 0.44 0.42 1.00 2.52 
Service importsc 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.19 
Commodity exports 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.32 1.62 
Service exportse 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.30 0.49 
Official aidd 0.19 0.37 0.22 0.15 0.07 
Foreign loans - - 0.00 0.17 0.63 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea and Economic Statisrics 
book 
aPreliminary data. 
hIncludes freight and insurance. 
CTotal invisible payments or receipts minus investment income and donations. 
dIncluding imports financed by properties and claims funds from Japan. 
10.81 
1.68 
10.05 
2.69 
0.00 
1.02 
Year- 
-
which had peaked in 1957 at nearly $400 million, had already begun 
to decline. The government not only increased taxation and raised inter- 
est rates to encourage domestic savings, but also enacted measures de- 
signed to encourage an inflow of foreign loans. Borrowing from abroad 
turned out to be a major source of capital formation in Korea in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. 
As can be seen in table 8.1, the acceleration in the growth rate was 
accompanied by a very rapid shift in the structure of production. Agri- 
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Table 8.2 Composition of Korean Exports by Major Sectors, Selected 
Years 1953 to 1975 (Percentage Distribution) 
Machinery 
and Trans- 
Equipment 
Food and Crude Mineral Manufactured portation 
SITC Code Beverages Materials Fuels Chemicals Goods 
Year (Oandl )  (2and4)  (3) ( 5 )  ( 6 a n d 8 )  (7) 
- 1953 5.6 89.6 2.6 - 2.3 
1955 6.2 81.8 2.7 .5 7.3 1.3 
1957 15.2 65.9 .O .o 18.2 .3 
1960 30.9 48.8 3.5 1.2 12.3 .3 
1963 20.8 30.5 3.0 1.0 39.8 4.7 
1965 16.6 21.2 1.1 .2 57.6 3.1 
1968 11.7 13.5 .5 .7 68.2 5.4 
1970 9.6 12.0 1.1 1.4 68.7 7.4 
1972 7.5 7.4 1.1 2.2 71.2 10.6 
1975 13.2 3 .O 2.0 1.3 66.3 13.8 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
Note:  Figures do not add to 100 owing both to rounding and to a small “unclassi- 
fied” category in Korean imports. 
culture, forestry, and fishing, which had accounted for 44 percent of 
GNP in 1957, constituted less than 20 percent by 1977. Manufacturing 
rose from 9 to 35 percent of GNP over the same period. Accompany- 
ing these changes, the share of agricultural employment fell from 61 
percent of total employed persons in 1963 to 40 percent in 1977. 
The high rate of economic growth in Korea has been accompanied by 
a high rate of population growth, although it has fallen significantly in 
recent years. During the period 1963-76, the population aged fourteen 
years and over increased at an average annual rate of about 3 percent. 
Despite this, recorded urban unemployment has fallen sharply (see 
section 8.1.4). 
8.1.2 International Trade 
The Pattern and Composition of Trade 
Reflecting the transformation of the entire economy, the commodity 
composition of Korea’s trade has changed markedly from that of the 
1950s. Until the early sixties, the major export items were such primary 
products as metals, ores, and concentrates, raw materials of vegetable or 
animal origin, fish, swine, and raw silk. By the mid-sixties, plywood, 
textiles, clothing, and miscellaneous manufactures emerged as the princi- 
pal export commodities. In the early 1970s, electronic products, foot- 
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wear, steel plates and sheets, and woven synthetic fabrics joined the 
list of major exports. In addition, the rapid expansion in Korean ship- 
ping, tourist services, remittances from Korean workers abroad, and 
revenues from overseas construction projects made large contributions 
to a remarkable increase in noncommodity exports. 
The rapid shift in the commodity composition of exports can be seen 
from the data in table 8.2. Starting from a NRB-dependent/export 
structure (albeit with exports equaling only a small fraction of GNP), 
manufactured goods-from SITC sectors 5 through 8-rose from less 
than 5 percent of exports in 1953 to about 14 percent in 1960, 77 per- 
cent in 1970, and 81 percent in 1975. Table 8.3 enumerates the fifteen 
largest four-digit export categories for 1971. As can be seen, textile and 
apparel items were dominant, although iron and steel products, plywood, 
footwear, and fishery products were also important. 
Table 8.4 gives data on the origin and destination of exports and im- 
ports. The United States was the largest single market for Korean exports, 
with Japan second. Exports to LDCs were relatively unimportant until 
the mid-l970s, accounting for 13 percent of exports in 1970, the year 
I focus on. A higher share of imports-17 percent-originated in LDCs, 
but these were mostly raw materials. Because of data difficulties and 
the relatively small size of Korea’s trade with developing countries in 
1970, no separate estimates are given below for the factor proportions 
of trade with DCs contrasted with LDCs. 
Table 8.3 
SITC Code 
8414 
841 1 
63 12 
8999 
7293 
Major Four-Digit Commodities Exported, 1971 
Value 
(Millions of 
Commodity U.S. Dollars) 
Clothes and accessories, knitted or crocheted 132.9 
Clothing of textile fabrics 129.2 
Plywood 126.8 
Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 
Valves and tubes 
70.6 
48.5 
2613 Raw silk 39.3 
8510 Footwear 37.4 
8412 Clothing and accessories made of fabric 36.2 
6521 Cotton fabrics (unbleached) 20.7 
0311 Fish (fresh, chilled, and frozen) 20.0 
6516 Yarn and thread of synthetic fibers 19.2 
6743 Iron and steel plates and sheets 19.2 
6556 Twine, cord, and rope 17.2 
6535 Fabrics made of synthetic fibers 14.4 
0313 Crustaceans and mollusks 14.1 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
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Table 8.4 Pattern of Trade among Countries, Selected Years 
1953 to 1975 
Exports Imports 
Other Other 
United Developed United Developed 
States Japan Countries States Japan Countries 
1953 77% 15% 1% 23 % 16% 2% 
1955 41 40 7 23 6 11  
1960 11 61 13 39 20 27 
1965 35 25 14 39 36 10 
1970 47 28 12 29 41 13 
1975 30 25 24 26 33 13 
~~~ 
Sources: Korean Traders Association, Trade Yearbook: 1953; Bank of Korea, 
Annual Economic Review, 1957; Economic Planning Board, Statistical Yearbook, 
1966 and 1977. 
The Trade Regime 
In the 1950s the Korean currency was highly overvalued because of 
destruction caused by the war, the resultant shortages of various essen- 
tial goods, and the associated inflation. The government nonetheless re- 
sisted devaluation as long as possible. Export promotion was not given 
serious consideration. 
Trade and industrialization policies were designed essentially to over- 
come the various side effects of currency overvaluation, which had re- 
sulted in inefficiencies of resource allocation. The government bureau- 
cracies, especially the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), gained powerful controls over the pri- 
vate economy by maintaining a disequilibrium system associated with 
the currency overvaluation. It was only in the sixties that a movement 
toward import liberalization and a vigorous export promotion began, 
although some early measures, as for example export incentives, were 
begun in the late 1950s. 
Not only were the range and variety of export incentives smaller in 
the fifties than later, but the scale and intensity of each incentive scheme 
were much weaker. For instance, although an export credit system ex- 
isted in this period, the automatically synchronized short-term export 
credit system (awarding a specified number of won per dollar exported) 
via unlimited rediscounts at the Bank of Korea and the allocation of 
large amounts of long-term loans for direct investment in export pro- 
duction became possible only in the sixties. Tariff exemptions on equip- 
ment and raw materials imported for export production, together with 
generous wastage allowances, were also introduced in the sixties. 
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The policymakers of the fifties simply could not imagine the possibility 
of Korea’s exporting large amounts of rice, as it did in the colonial 
period, or exporting, on the basis of its very limited experience, sig- 
nificant quantities of manufactured goods. Their major concern was to 
maximize aid inflows, save foreign exchange, and promote import sub- 
stitution. This is not meant to imply that the policymakers of the sixties 
started export promotion policies because they could perceive all the 
advantages of export-oriented growth as later revealed. The adoption of 
an export promotion policy was a natural response to the declining 
grants-in-aid and expanding demand for foreign exchange. The officials 
promoted exports, saw the benefits, and consequently adopted an export- 
oriented growth strategy. Several instruments were used for the purpose, 
including tax incentives, tariff exemptions, and financial and other 
inducements.2 
It seems clear that most of the export promotion policies of the sixties 
did not systematically favor specific export industries selected with a 
view to their factor intensity. As demonstrated by the First Five-Year 
Plan document, in the early sixties the government did not envision a 
major role for labor-intensive manufactured exports. However, as export 
expansion developed along the lines of classical comparative advantage 
theory, the government quickly started to encourage investments into 
such emerging export sectors as textiles, clothing, plywood, electronics, 
and wigs. While the authorities maintained a high effective exchange 
rate for exports, it was private entrepreneurs who played the major role 
in determining sectoral resource allocation for exports. Of course some 
policies, such as the subsidized financing of capital goods imports, could 
have indirectly affected the factor intensity of exports as well as import 
substitution. 
In preparing the Fourth Five-Year Plan ( 1977-8 1 ) , the Korean gov- 
ernment appears to have adopted policies that may directly affect the 
factor intensity of exports. It has started to plan investment schedules 
for such industries as shipbuilding, electronics, machinery, steel and 
metal products, and petrochemicals, anticipating that Korea will soon 
have comparative advantage in these industries and will be in a position 
to export their products. Thus, by selecting specific industries to be pro- 
moted as major export sectors, government decisions have started to 
affect directly the factor intensity of exports and employment growth. 
After the sixties, Korean entrepreneurs soon learned that generous 
subsidies and other promotional schemes would be provided for pro- 
duction activities the government wished to support, while various disin- 
centives would be applied to nonfavored activities. As a result, in the 
seventies most of the large firms that could successfully accumulate 
wealth from light manufacturing, including textiles and footwear pro- 
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duction, have willingly started to invest in manufacture of steel and 
other metal products, electrical and nonelectrical machinery, electronic 
products, shipbuilding, other transportation equipment, and petrochemi- 
cal products. 
In Korea a successful entrepreneur usually owns, possibly as a result 
of economies of scale in financial operations, a group of firms involved 
in various activities extending from import substituting production for 
the domestic market to exclusively export-oriented production. As the 
emphasis of the government shifts from simple labor-intensive manufac- 
tures to more skill- and capital-intensive manufactures, the entrepreneur 
begins to adapt to this shift by investing in a new set of projects, adjust- 
ing the relative scale of existing production activities, and reshuffling 
workers accordingly. This ability of Korean entrepreneurs to adapt to 
changing economic variables and venture into new activities, combined 
with government policies that encourage continual shifts in production 
activities, seem to constitute the necessary ingredients for rapid economic 
growth. 
In weighing the policies underlying successful export expansion in 
Korea since 1962, one should not fail to note that the most important 
factor has been the commitment of the government to promoting ex- 
ports. This effort has involved the government at all levels from the 
president down to officials responsible for export administration work, 
together with the entire private sector related to exports, through the 
monthly sessions of the “Expanded Meeting for Export Promotion.” It 
is at these meetings that various problems in export expansion are 
identified and activities coordinated. Furthermore, successful exporters 
are highly honored and encouraged. This has an immense psychological 
impact in a society that still carries remnants of traditional Confucian- 
ism. This honor and encouragement bestowed on exporters has un- 
doubtedly helped channel the best of the entrepreneurial class in Korea 
into export activities. 
With such a strong national commitment to export promotion, the 
relevant ministers, especially the minister of commerce and industry, are 
expected to show no less enthusiasm for the cause. The MCI announces 
the annual export target at the beginning of each year. If there develops a 
risk that the target will not be met, the staff of the MCI and other offi- 
cials concerned with export administration work seven days a week and 
overtime to expedite administrative processes, to strengthen existing 
export support schemes, to institute new subsidies, and to exert irresisti- 
ble pressures on businessmen to accelerate exports even though it may 
entail losses. If all such efforts fail to achieve the target amount, MCI 
officials may even try to adulterate export statistics-for example, by 
counting receipts in advance of exports or exports without drafts in 
bonded processing as actual exports. This is why there have been sig- 
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nificant differences between the MCI export figures and the Bank of 
Korea’s (BOK) export figures, which are based on customs clearances, 
and why MCI has sometimes reported a sharp drop in exports in Jan- 
uary. Such overenthusiasm for export expansion has apparently caused 
some losses (Hong 1976), but it has kept fueling the export oriented 
growth process in Korea. 
As I mentioned already, quantitative restrictions and import licensing 
were important components of the trade regime in the 1950s. Their 
importance diminished substantially in the 1960s. Quantitative controls 
were lessened after the 1964 devaluation. They were further relaxed in 
1967 when a switch was made in the MCI system from a positive list 
of items that could be imported, with or without authorization, to a 
negative list of items that could not be imported without specific gov- 
ernment authorization. Import licenses were automatically approved for 
all commodities (AA items) unless they were on the list of restricted 
or prohibited items. 
Under the negative list system, more than half of the 1,312 basic 
( five-digit SITC) import items became AA commodities. There were 
about seventy prohibited import items during 1967-76, but the number 
of quota items has decreased steadily from more than one hundred in 
1967-68 to zero in 1976. On the other hand, the number of items that, 
though not subject to quotas, require recommendations from MCI or 
other appropriate ministries has steadily increased from more than 300 
items in 1967 to 550 in 1975 (see table 8.5) and more than 600 in 1976. 
Importers of these items must acquire approval to import and frequently 
must also get approval for the quantity of imports from MCI or other 
appropriate authorities. Although this system is more flexible than a 
quota or a system linking imports to export performance, the govern- 
ment can still effectively control the amount of imports of each com- 
modity group by imposing annual import ceilings on the basis of esti- 
mated import needs and the overall balance of payments situation. More 
than half the items that require approval have been subject to such 
ceilings, resulting in an effect similar to quantitative  restriction^.^ 
In principle, imports of finished consumer goods have not been al- 
lowed. Imports of raw materials for exports were normally approved 
automatically, irrespective of their classification. However, quantitative 
restrictions were sometimes applied when there were influential domestic 
suppliers of these raw material. This generated conflicts between export 
producers who wanted to use low-priced (and high-quality) imported 
raw materials and domestic producers of high-priced (and allegedly 
poor-quality ) raw materials. 
To accelerate investment, capital goods imports received preferential 
treatment and, to raise the utilization rate of existing capacity, inter- 
mediate goods imports also received preferential treatment. Since the 
Table 8.5 Sectoral Pattern of Import Restrictions, Based on 1,312 Basic (Five-Digit) SITC Items 
Sector 
1967 (Second Half) 1970 (Second Half) 1975 (Second Half) 
Prohibited, Recom- Prohibited, Recom- Prohibited, Recom- 
Linked, and mendation Linked, and mendation Linked, and mendation 
Quota Items Required Quota Items Required Quota Items Required 
Total restricted imports 220 (100%) 337(100%) 
Mining 2 (1%) 1 (0%) 
Agriculture and fishery 2 (1%) 41 (12%) 
Manufacturing 216 (98%) 295 (88%) 
Food products 8 (4%) 48 (14%) 
Textile products 83 (38%) 16 (5%) 
Wood products 9 (4%) 11 (3%) 
Paper products 
Rubber products 
Chemicals 
15 (7%) 8 (2%) 
10 (5%) 2 (1%) 
16 (7%) 52 (15%) 
Nonmetallic products 9 (4%)  8 (2%) 
Metal products 14 (6%) 26 (8%) 
Machinery 0 (0%)  13 (4%) 
Electrical machinery 2 (1%) 21 (6%) 
Miscellaneous manufactures 47 (21%) 56 (17%) 
Share in total imports (7% 1 (23%) 
Basic metals 3 (1%) 22 (7%) 
Transportation equipment 0 (0%) 12 (4%) 
Amount of import ($ million) 70 220 
157 (100%) 437 (100%) 
2 (1%) 49 (11%) 
2 (1%) 9 (2%) 
153 (97%) 379 (87%) 
7 ( 5 % )  60 (16%) 
41 (27%) 51 (14%) 
4 (3%) 13 (3%) 
11 (7%) 10 (3%)  
10 (7%) 1 (0%) 
10 (7%) 61 (16%) 
4 (3%) 7 (2%) 
10 (7%) 23 (6%)  
11 (7%) 26 (7%) 
5 (3%) 17 (5%) 
4 (3%) 22 (6%) 
0 (0%) 19 (5%)  
36 (24%) 69 (18%) 
128 842 
(6% ) (42%) 
110 (100%) 
1 (1%) 
0 (0%) 
109 (99%) 
6 (6%) 
39 (36%) 
3 (3%)  
6 (6%)  
6 (6%)  
4 (4%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
7 (6%) 
6 (6%) 
12 (11%) 
0 (0%) 
20 (18%) 
590 
(9% ) 
553 (100%) 
53 (10%) 
20 (4%) 
480 (87%) 
74 (15%) 
53 (11%) 
12 (3%)  
21 (4%) 
2 (0%) 
73 (15%) 
18 (4%) 
31 (7%) 
26 ( 5 % )  
42 (9%)  
15 (3%) 
21 (4%) 
92 (19%) 
3,190 
(44% ) 
Source: Hong (1977). 
351 Export Promotion and Employment Growth in South Korea 
intermediate and capital goods imports were subject to fewer quantita- 
tive controls, import substitution for these goods could not be as profit- 
able as for consumption goods. Korea’s relative failure to promote inter- 
mediate and capital goods industries in the fifties and sixties positively 
contributed to the rapid export expansion in the late sixties and seven- 
ties, because manufacturers of export goods were relatively free to use 
low-cost imported intermediate and capital goods instead of high-cost 
domestic products. While there was some earlier import substitution, as 
for example in fertilizers, it was largely in commodities that exporters 
did not use as inputs. 
In the mid-seventies, however, the government’s emphasis has clearly 
shifted to active development of various intermediate and capital goods 
industries both for domestic consumption and for export. Should these 
industries fail to achieve efficiency in terms of international competitive- 
ness because of abuse of tariff and nontariff protection measures, the 
adverse effects may spread over the entire field of production in Korea 
whether for domestic consumption or for export. The effect of high-cost 
intermediate and capital goods may be more serious than that of high- 
cost consumer goods, although this could occur only if exporters were 
constrained to buy from domestic sources. 
Balance of Payments 
As was seen in table 8.1, imports of commodities and services ex- 
ceeded exports until the mid-1970s. Korea achieved a current account 
surplus for the first time in 1977. As I already mentioned, the deficits 
of the 1950s were financed almost entirely by foreign aid: with an over- 
valued exchange rate and almost no exports, Korea was not credit- 
worthy for foreign loans, and prospects for repatriation of profits were 
not attractive to foreign investors. As aid flows diminished in the late 
1950s, the Korean government began taking measures to attract foreign 
capital, primarily in the form of loans. As can be seen from table 8.1, 
these loans increased in size and importance. In recent years, foreign 
direct investment has assumed some importance in Korea, although it 
has remained much smaller than foreign borrowing. 
Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 8.6 gives data on nominal, effective, and price level adjusted 
exchange rates for exports and imports. The price level deflated EER for 
exports, with or without adjustments for trading partners’ price levels, 
rose significantly from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. After sizable 
fluctuations in the early 1960s (not all shown in table 8.6), the real 
exchange rate has fluctuated much less since that time. This reflects the 
government’s policy of relying much more on the exchange rate to pro- 
mote exports and import substitutes. 
Table 8.6 Nominal, Effective, and Price-Adjusted Exchange Rates for Exports and Imports, Selected Years, 1955-75 (Won per 
Dollar) 
Rate 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1975 
A. Official exchange rate 
~~ ~~~ ~~ 
37 50 128 214 27 1 311 398 485 
Export rates 
B. Export dollar premiums n.a. 64 15 40 
C. Export subsidies n.a. 1 9 27 62 88 94 81 
D. Effective exchange rate (EER) 
for exports (A + B + C) 72 115 151 28 1 333 399 493 566 
E. Price level deflated EER for exportsa n.a. 289 294 3 10 286 27 3 255 163 
F. Purchasing power parity EER 
for exportsb 224 281 289 305 299 308 396 321 
- - - - 
Import rates 
G .  Tariffs and tariff equivalents n.a. 14 20 33 26 26 19 25 
H. Effective exchange rate (EER) 
for imports (A + G) 42 64 147 247 296 336 418 510 
1. Price level deflated EER for importsa n.a. 160 287 272 256 23 1 216 147 
J. Purchasing power parity EER 
for importsb 131 156 282 268 266 260 332 287 
Sources: Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975); Westphal and Kim (1977). 
hImmediately preceding item multiplied by average price level of trading partners. 
hImmediately preceding item multipled by average price level of trading partners. 
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8.1.3 Structure of Protection 
Table 8.1 depicts the rapid growth of manufacturing’s importance in 
the South Korean production structure and the steady decrease in the 
importance of NRB sectors. By 1977 the modernized manufacturing 
sector contributed about 35 percent of GNP, while the social overhead 
sectors contributed nearly 10 percent. The once-dominant agricultural 
sector had declined to a mere 16 percent of GNP, and even the share of 
the service sectors was reduced to about 35 percent, from 43 percent in 
1962. Paralleling these trends in output, the composition of employ- 
ment also altered: the share of agricultural employment fell from 61 per- 
cent of total employed persons in 1963 to 40 percent in 1977. 
8.1.4 The Labor Market 
A consistent series of employment data for Korea is available only for 
the period after 1962. Korea’s labor force has grown at an average an- 
nual rate of 3 percent since 1963. Before 1963, nearly two-thirds of 
employed persons were engaged in agriculture, and unemployment in 
nonfarm areas was estimated to have been more than 16 percent. 
Industrial employment began rising sharply in the sixties. As can be 
seen from table 8.7, the real wage began rising after 1964. Simulta- 
neously, the share of employment in agriculture fell and the overall unem- 
ployment rate was reduced. In 1977 the urban unemployment rate was 
estimated to have fallen to 5.8 percent. I 
Although there is reason to believe that capital was implicitly subsi- 
dized through a variety of credit-rationing devices, the Korean labor 
market seems to have been fairly distortion-free by the late 1960s: un- 
ions were nonexistent or had relatively little power, and government 
regulations did not result in a wage above market-clearing levels. It 
appears that the Korean labor market was transformed from one fairly 
typical for LDCs, with open unemployment and slow urban employment 
growth, to a neoclassical, full-employment labor market by the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  
8.1.5 Inflation 
Inflation has been a significant factor in Korea throughout the period 
since 1953, although inflation rates have varied substantially in different 
subintervals. On a 1970 base, wholesale prices in 1953 were only 8.2, 
and they rose to 31.0 in 1960. This represented an average annual rate 
of increase of 19 percent. As already discussed, this contributed to the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate and the severity of exchange controls 
during the 1950s. 
The period from 1960 to 1964 was one during which the switch in 
policies away from import substitution was made. This was followed, in 
1964-65, by a series of budgetary and financial reforms, including, as 
Table 8.7 Korean Labor Force and Employment: 1963-77 
Unemployment Rate 
Population Total Manufacturing Farm Nonfarm Manufacturing 
Fourteen and over Employment Employment Household Household Real Wage 
(Thousand Persons) (Thousand Persons) (Thousand Persons) (% ) (%)  (1975 = 100) 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
15,085 
15,502 
15,937 
16,367 
16,764 
17,166 
17,639 
18,253 
18,984 
19,724 
20,438 
21,148 
21,833 
22,549 
23,336 
6,933 
7,799 
8,206 
8,423 
8,717 
9,155 
9,414 
9,745 
10,066 
10,559 
11,139 
11,586 
11,830 
12,556 
12,929 
610 
637 
772 
833 
1,02 1 
1,170 
1,232 
1,284 
1,336 
1,445 
1.774 
2,012 
2,205 
2,678 
2,798 
2.9 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
2.3 
1.9 
2.2 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1 .o 
1.2 
1.3 
1 .o 
1.1 
16.4 
14.4 
13.5 
12.8 
11.1 
9.0 
7.8 
7.4 
7.4 
7.5 
6.8 
6.8 
6.6 
6.3 
5.8 
55.1 
51.8 
57.7 
59.6 
63.0 
68.8 
80.5 
89.9 
95.3 
95.6 
93.7 
97.4 
100.0 
113.7 
131.7 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Acfive Population, various issues, and Bank of Korea, Economics 
Statistics Yearbook, various issues. GNP deflator was used to compute real wage rates. 
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I already mentioned, an increase in nominal interest rates. One result of 
this was that wholesale prices, whose index stood at 62.3 in 1964, rose 
much more slowly during the 1960s, averaging a 7.9 percent increase 
per year. As in most countries, inflation has accelerated in the 1970s, 
with rates of increase of 42 and 21 percent in 1974 and 1975 
respectively. 
In addition to monetary reforms, however, the Korean government 
began in about 1964 maintaining the real exchange rate at a fairly con- 
stant level, as already seen. Since the early 1960s, therefore, the Korean 
trade and payments regime has been fairly well shielded from the effects 
of the inflation. 
8.1.6 Summary 
The salient features of Korea’s growth have been the emphasis upon 
export promotion and the transformation of the economy under those 
policies. Growth has been so rapid that a snapshot of the economy at 
any one point in time fails to capture the phenomenon: exports and the 
domestic production structure shifted from a heavy emphasis on rural, 
primary-commodity activities toward a modern, industrial sector orienta- 
tion. Per capita incomes have risen sharply in this process, and urban 
employment and real wages also increased rapidly. A central question 
is the extent to which the export promotion policies accounted for the 
turnaround in the labor market and in employment. Closely related is 
the question whether recent policies, with somewhat greater emphasis 
upon heavy industry, will permit a continuation of past trends in em- 
ployment and real wages. 
8.2 The Trade Regime and the Structure of Protection 
8.2.1 Tariffs 
In the fifties and early sixties, the government relied on various quan- 
titative import restrictions to offset the adverse effects of the overvalu- 
ation of the domestic currency on the balance of payments. A complex 
structure of multiple exchange rates also developed; nonetheless, on 
balance the structure of incentives during this period was biased against 
exports. Import liberalization in the 1960s consisted primarily of re- 
duced reliance on quantitative controls and the shift already mentioned 
from a positive list to a negative list system. Tariff rates were not altered 
significantly during 1963-75. Data for 1968-72 can therefore be re- 
garded as broadly representative of the rates in effect throughout the 
export promotion years. 
According to the Major Taxation Statistics data of the Bureau of 
Taxation, available for years after 1968, the average legal tariff rate (in- 
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cluding special tariffs) for all commodity imports was about 26 percent 
during 1968-72. The average legal tariff rate was reduced to 24 percent 
in 1973 and to between 12 and 15 percent during 1974-75. However, 
because of tariff exemptions on materials for export production and for 
key industries and foreign investment projects (whose imports were 
rapidly increasing), the average rate of tariffs actually collected was only 
8 or 9 percent from 1966 to 1970 and declined further to about 6 per- 
cent during 1971-72. This was due partly to generally lowered legal 
tariff rates and partly to a sudden increase in tariff-exempt imports of 
crude oil, which had been subject to a 5 percent tariff during 1968-74. 
The average rate of tariffs actually collected has amounted to only about 
5 percent since 1973. 
To ascertain the extent to which tariff data are sensitive to the choice 
of weights, I computed weighted average legal tariff rates using actual 
individual import volumes as weights. The average legal tariff rate so 
computed on all commodity imports was raised from 17 percent in 
1963-67 to 26 percent in 1968-72 but was lowered to 20 percent in 
1973-74 and to 12 percent in 1975 (see table 8.8). The 1967 tariff 
reform appears to have slightly lowered the simple arithmetic average 
tariff rate on all imports, but substantial shifts in the import pattern 
tended to raise the weighted average legal tariff rate. The legal tariff 
rates were very low on minerals, relatively low on agricultural products, 
and very high on most manufactures. Lower rates were preserved for 
essential raw materials than for finished goods and for noncompeting 
capital goods than for competing consumption goods. 
8.2.2 Effective Rates of Protection 
According to the sectoral effective rates of protection estimated by 
Westphal and Kim for 1968, the average ERP for agriculture, as shown 
in table 8.9, was about 18 percent and that for mining was about 3 
percent, while the average ERP for manufacturing as a whole was a 
minus 1 percent (Westphal and Kim 1977). The average level of pro- 
tection, especially that in manufacturing, was very low in Korea com- 
pared with other developing countries, which may reflect the fact that 
the exchange rate in 1968 was not greatly overvalued. However, the 
average ERP on import-competing manufacturing industries was esti- 
mated to be as high as 92 percent in 1968, while that on export indus- 
tries and noncompeting industries was estimated to be below minus 10 
percent. Furthermore, while the effective protection rates for domestic 
sales of import-competing and export-import industries were fairly high, 
the rates for export sales were either near zero or negative for all cate- 
gories of industries. As Westphal and Kim suggest, ERPs may be indica- 
tors either of relative profitability or of relative inefficiency. Hence the 
negative rates on export industries and export sales of other industries 
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may indicate no room for either excess profitability or substantial ineffi- 
ciency, while the extremely high rate on import-competing industries 
may indicate the opposite. The results might be interpreted as indicat- 
ing that Korea’s export promotion policies were relatively more efficient 
than its import substitution policies. 
Table 8.8 
Sector 1963-67 1968-72 1973-74 1975 
Weighted Average Sectoral Tariff Rates (Basic Rates) 
Rice, barley, and wheat 14% 18% 16% 0% 
Other agriculture 11 17 13 5 
Forestry 10 10 10 7 
Fisheries 28 39 37 36 
Coal 10 10 10 0 
Other minerals 1 6 5 3 
Processed foods 37 35 12 11 
Beverages 180 150 150 150 
Tobacco 224 95 126 150 
Fiber spinning 30 64 52 47 
Textile fabrics 75 98 81 80 
Textile products 49 89 75 77 
Lumber and plywood 12 16 30/25 25 
Wood and furniture 80 91 76 75 
Paper and products 10 10 11 15 
Printing 0 0 0 0 
Leather and products 75 68 61 60 
Rubber products 41 51 44 38 
Basic chemicals 23 24 24 21 
Other chemicals 26 47 45 27 
Chemical fertilizer 5 0 0 0 
Petroleum products 18 20 20 20 
Coal products 20 S 5 5 
Nonmetallic minerals 17 29 26 22 
Iron and steel 10 12 11 18 
Steel products 16 28 28 19 
Nonferrous metals 12 2s 22 16 
Metal products 33 45 40 40 
Machinery 16 20 15 18 
Transportation equipment 32 38 15 17 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 19 55 55 52 
Scrap 21 7 6 6 
Electrical machinery 21 29 28 33 
Agricultural products 13 15 13 3 
Minerals 2 6 5 3 
Manufacturing 20 34 26 23 
All commodities 17 26 20 12 
Source: Hong (1977). 
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Table 8.9 Average Effective Protection Rates by Major Industrial Groups: 
1968 
Effective Protection 
Legal Nominal 
Protectiona Protectiona Export Domestic Average 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Export industriesb 
Import-cornpetingc 
Exports-importsd 
Noncompetinge 
All tradables 
36% 
10 
59 
54 
55 
46 
64 
49 
17% 
7 
11 
5 
32 
23 
5 
13 
-16% 
-1 
3 
5 
-9 
-2 
-1 
- 
19% 
4 
-1 
-18 
93 
73 
- 16 
18% 
3 
-1 
-11 
92 
45 
- 16 
10 
Source: Westphal and Kim (1977). 
Notes: Based on Balassa method. 
aLegal protection is tariff protection. Nominal protection is actual, or realized, 
protection on prices. Legal tariff rates sometimes exceed nominal rates owing to 
tariff redundancy and duty exemptions as exporters import their raw material and 
intermediate imports duty-free. 
hManufacturing industries exporting more than 10 percent of total production. 
CManufacturing sectors in which imports provide more than 10 percent of total 
dExports greater than 10 percent of total production and imports greater than 10 
percent of total domestic supply. 
eAll other sectors. This classification system is not the same as the one used in 
other studies in this volume. For comparison, “export industries” and “export- 
import” here would include some of both “import competing” and “noncompeting 
imports” used in other studies. 
supply. 
8.3 Factor Supply and Factor Intensity of Trade 
8.3.1 Factory Intensity of Trade 
Table 8.10 shows factor requirements of trade in Korea in 1970, 
computed using domestic production as weights. Note that factor re- 
quirements are measured here by the amount of capital and the amount 
of labor per unit of value of output, and that factor intensity is measured 
by the ratio of capital requirements to labor  requirement^.^ The total 
amount of labor required to produce $100 million worth of exports was 
67,000 persons, while the capital required amounted to about $99 mil- 
lion. On the other hand, the labor required to produce $100 million 
worth of import-competing goods was 74,000 persons, and capital re- 
quirements amounted to about $1  15 million.6 Import-competing re- 
placements thus appear to have been slightly more capital-intensive than 
exports. 
The most remarkable fact emerging from table 8.10, however, seems 
to be that the capital-intensity of Korea’s noncompeting non-NRB im- 
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Table 8.10 Factor Requirements per $100 Million of Tradable Goods 
by Trade Category, 1970 
Category 
Capital (K) Labor (N) Factor 
(Million (Thousand Intensity 
1970 Dollars) Persons) (KIN) 
Exports (HOS and NRB) 99.0 67.0 1,478 
Import-comepting products (HOS and 
NRB) 115.0 74.0 1,554 
Noncompeting imports, applying 
1947 United States coefficients 182.9 8.9 20,551 
1958 United States coefficients 165.2 7.3 22,630 
1965 Japanese coefficients 135.7 33.3 4,075 
1970 Japanese coefficients 130.9 27.3 4,795 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: The amount of capital directly and indirectly required for exports was com- 
puted with k [ I  - ,461-1 and that for import-competing products with k[I - AI-l ,  
where k represents the direct capital-output ratio, Ad the matrix of domestic input 
coefficients, and A the matrix of domestic and imported input coefficients for 
import-competing products. Labor requirements were computed in the same 
fashion. Both matrixes include indirect requirements of tradables. The justification 
for the different treatment of exports and import-competing products is that export 
industries can import raw materials and intermediate inputs, whereas import- 
substituting industries usually have to use domestic inputs. See text for the list 
of excluded NRB items. 
ports, estimated by using the United States and Japanese sectoral factor 
coefficients, was much higher than that of either the export or the 
import-competing sectors. Crude oil, timber, raw cotton, raw sugar, 
crude rubber, and wool were excluded from the computation, being re- 
garded as noncompeting NRB tradable goods. 
Westphal and Kim (1977) have also estimated the factor intensity of 
trade, again using production (not value added) as weights. Their 
results for 1968 correspond with those reported in table 8.9: they esti- 
mated total labor requirements of all exporting sectors to be 7.53 man- 
years of labor per million 1965 won of output compared with 6.62 man- 
years for a comparable value of import-competing production (which 
probably had a higher ratio of value added to output). Westphal and 
Kim were also able to estimate factor intensities separately for manu- 
facturers. For manufactured exports, they estimated labor requirements 
at 7.9 man-years, with a corresponding figure of import-competing pro- 
duction of 5.56. The labor-capital ratio in manufactured exports was 
4.29, and that of import-competing production was 2.74 (Westphal and 
Kim 1977, pp. 4-47). 
Therefore Korea’s trade appears to have been consistent with the 
HOS comparative advantage doctrine, especially with respect to exports 
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versus noncompeting, non-NRB imports, and manufactured exports 
versus manufactured import-competing production. 
The largest difference in factor intensities lies not between exports 
and import-competing goods but between both of these categories and 
noncompeting imports. 
8.3.2 
The factor intensity of trade has been changing over time. According 
to the trade statistics in BOK’s input-output tables, commodity exports 
increased about thirty-five times (in 1970 prices), while the estimated 
number of persons employed directly and indirectly in export produc- 
tion increased about 8.5 times (from 0.15 million to 1.24 million) dur- 
ing 1963-75. This implies average annual growth rates of about 35 per- 
cent and 20 percent, respectively, and an export expansion elasticity of 
employment of about 0.6. The fixed capital stock directly and indirectly 
employed for export production increased about thirty-seven times (from 
$0.10 billion to $3.90 billion) over the same period, implying an average 
annual growth rate of 35 percent and an export expansion elasticity of 
capital absorption of about 1 .O. 
Production of competitive imports increased about 6.4 times while the 
estimated number of persons required directly and indirectly to replace 
these competing imports increased about 2.5 times (from 0.41 million 
to 1.02 million) during 1963-75. This implies average annual growth 
rates of about 16.5 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively, and an import 
replacement elasticity of employment of about 0.5. The fixed capital 
stock directly and indirectly required for import replacements increased 
about 7.2 times (from $0.39 billion to $2.80 billion) over the same 
period, implying an average annual growth rate of 18 percent and an 
import replacement elasticity of capital requirement of about 1.1. 
Han (1970) has computed the amount of fixed capital stock em- 
ployed in Korean industries on the basis of the 1968 National Wealth 
Survey. To estimate the fixed capital stock by years for the period after 
1953, I used Han’s estimate for 1968 as a benchmark and subtracted or 
added the BOK’s fixed capital formation figures for successive years. 
The results, starting with 1962, are shown on a per capita basis in con- 
stant 1970 prices in table 8.11. 
Total net real fixed capital stock in Korea, excluding household 
wealth in the form of dwellings, increased at an average annual rate of 
3.5 percent during 1953-61, at 6.7 percent per annum during 1962-66, 
and at a remarkable 13 percent per annum during 1967-76. Per capita, 
however, the net capital stock increased by only about 30 percent dur- 
ing the thirteen-year period from 1953 to 1966, and it was only after 
1966 that it began to increase rapidly. From then until 1976, capital 
stock per capita increased by about 170 percent. Owing to rapidly in- 
Capital Accumulation and Changes in Factor Intensity of Trade 
Table 8.11 Changes in Factor Endowment 
Manufacturing 
All Industry 
Net Capital Stock Net Capital Stock 
Employed (1970 Dollars) Number of 
Year Per Capitz Person (Millions) M and M Census Han-BOK Data (Millions) 
( 1970 Dollars) Total per Worker Total 
Per Employed Persons Workers 
1963 175 
1964 179 
1965 185 
1966 20 1 
624 
641 
649 
702 
7.66 - 
7.80 - 
8.21 - 
8.42 1,723 
1967 220 761 8.72 1,637 
1968 249 837 9.16 1,610 
1969 287 962 9.41 1,831 
1970 322 1,065 9.75 1,983 
1971 356 1,163 10.07 2,302 
1,534 
1,549 
1,388 
1,528 
1,426 
1,437 
1,557 
1,665 
1,759 
0.61 
0.64 
0.77 
0.83 
1.02 
1.17 
1.23 
1.28 
1.34 
1972 383 1,214 10.56 2,326 1,701 1.45 
1973 418 1,180 11.14 2,748 1,583 1.77 
1974 453 1,358 11.59 2,806 1,488 2.01 
I975 495 1,477 11.83 3,119 1,447 2.21 
1976 545 1,557 12.56 3,220 1,310 2.68 
Source: Hong (1977). 
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creasing employment, capital stock per employed person increased by 
only about 120 percent. However, this still implies a significant overall 
capital deepening during 1966-76. 
For the manufacturing sector alone, data from the Census of Manu- 
factures indicate that the capital stock per worker has steadily and sig- 
nificantly increased since 1966, rising from $1,723 per worker in that 
year to $2,302 in 1971 and to $3,220 in 1976.' 
According to the Farm Household Survey data, capital stock per 
man-year input in agriculture was estimated at about $240 before 1967 
but increased significantly during 1967-73 to reach $560 in 1973. The 
capital stock per farmer (without taking account of underemployment) 
estimated on the basis of the Han-BOK capital stock data also doubled 
during 1966-74. 
Annual wages of farm employees increased rapidly after 1967 (from 
about $200 in that year to $410 in 1975 in 1970 prices), as did the 
wages of employees in manufacturing (from about $410 in 1967 to 
about $680 in 1975). On the other hand, the weighted average real 
interest rates on all types of loans supplied by both banking institutions 
and curb markets reached their peak in 1967 and thereafter declined 
steadily and substantially. Hence we can conclude that, since 1967, there 
has been a rapid and significant capital accumulation and capital deep- 
ening in Korea accompanied by a fast-rising wage/rental ratio (see 
tables 8.14 and 8.20). 
As capital accumulates and the wage/rental ratio rises, one can ex- 
pect more capital-intensive production techniques to become profitable 
both for domestic consumption and for exports, and production of more 
capital-intensive commodities will increase. Hence there should be a 
shift in factor intensity of both output and export production. 
The capital intensity (i.e., capital/labor ratio) of Korea's export 
bundle grew steadily during 1960-75. The ratio of capital to labor re- 
quired directly and indirectly for export production (excluding imported 
inputs) was about 0.6 in 1960 and increased to about 3.1 in 1975 
(defined as in table 8.12). However, the capital intensity of import- 
competing products did not increase as rapidly as that of exports during 
this time. Consequently, although import-competing production was 
much more capital-intensive than production of exports during 1963-68 
(e.g., 1.6 versus 1.0 in 1966), the difference subsequently became 
smaller. After 1970 there seem to have been only moderate differences 
in their factor intensities. In 1975 the capital intensity of exports was 
above that of import-competing products. In theory, there is no reason 
why the capital intensity of exports from Korea should be lower than 
that of its import-competing products. 
The total amount of labor required per unit of exports (at constant 
prices) steadily decreased from 1960 to 1975. That is, the (direct plus 
Table 8.12 Changes in Factor Intensity of Trade (Millions of 1970 Dollars and Thousands of Persons) 
1-0 Trade Data 1960 1963 1966 1968 1970 1973 1975 
A .  Production for  export 
1. Direct factor intensity 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Total capital employed (Ala + A2a) 
b. Total labor employed (Alb + A2b) 
2. Factor intensity of domestic inputs 
3. Factor intensity of imported inputs 
4. Aggregate Factor Intensity 
B. Import-competing production 
1. Direct factor intensity 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Capital content 
b. Labor content 
a. Total capital required (Bla + B2a + B3a) 
b. Total labor required (Blb + B2b + B3b) 
2. Factor intensity of domestic inputs 
3. Factor intensity of imported inputs 
4. Aggregate factor intensity 
(0.47) 
49 
105 
(0.83) 
49 
59 
(-1 
(-) 
(-1 
(0.59) 
97 
164 
(0.34) 
36 
105 
( 1.05) 
44 
42 
(-1 
(-1 
(-1 
(0.54) 
79 
147 
(0.58) (0.78) 
45 42 
78 54 
64 55 
75 44 
(-) (1.63) 
(-1 13 
(-1 8 
(0.71) ( 1 .OO) 
109 97 
153 97 
(0.85) (1.25) 
(0.70) ( 1.40) 
57 60 
82 43 
61 53 
42 29 
(-1 (1.75) 
(1.45) (1.83) 
(-) 21 
(-1 12 
(0.94) (1.58) 
117 134 
124 85 
(0.86) 
37 
43 
(1.49) 
55  
37 
(1.88) 
15 
8 
(1.15) 
91 
79 
(0.98) 
42 
43 
(2.08) 
52 
25 
(1.77) 
23 
13 
( 1.46) 
117 
80 
(1.08) 
43 
40 
(2.07) 
56 
27 
(2.75) 
22 
8 
99 
67 
(1.48) 
(1.05) 
46 
44 
(2.27) 
50 
22 
19 
9 
(1.55) 
115 
74 
(2.11) 
(1.73) 
38 
22 
43 
16 
35 
10 
(2.13) 
81 
38 
(2.69) 
(3.50) 
(1.57) 
44 
28 
(4.00) 
44 
11 
(3.91) 
43 
11 
(2.60) 
130 
50 
(2.86) 
60 
21 
(3.47) 
59 
17 
27 
8 
(3.13) 
119 
38 
(3.38) 
( 1.72) 
43 
25 
(4.17) 
57 
14 
33 
9 
(2.75) 
132 
48 
(3.67) 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: Factor intensity (figures in parentheses) is the amount of capital required divided by the amount of labor required per $100 million 
worth of exports or import-competing production. Note that, for reasons explained in the note to table 8.10, the aggregates for exports do 
not include, and the aggregates for import-competing production do include, the factor content of imported inputs. 
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indirect) labor/output ratios in export production as a whole decreased 
at an average annual rate of about 10 percent over the period. This 
trend seems to reflect the rapidly increasing labor productivity in export 
production owing to technical progress, factor substitution, and increas- 
ing returns to scale, on the one hand, and to shifts in the composition 
of the export bundle toward less labor-intensive products on the other. 
But in the case of capital requirements there was no rapid or sustained 
decline in the amount used per unit of exports. From the analysis in 
table 8.13, we can see that the substantial increase in capital intensity 
of Korea’s exports during 1966-73 was predominantly due to labor- 
saving factor substitutions in production processes and only slightly 
due to shifts in the composition of exports. 
8.4 Export Promotion and Subsidies on Capital Use 
Along with the significant increase in capital intensity of exports and 
import-competing products, there has been a sharp rise in the wage/ 
rental ratio in Korea since 1966. Although some of the capital-labor 
substitution in Korean industries may be attributed to the increase in 
capital stock per capita and the associated rise in the wage/rental ratio 
(that is, to a shift in the basic comparative advantage position), a sub- 
stantial portion, especially that which occurred in export industries, may 
have to be attributed to the subsidy on capital use. 
One of the most familiar themes in development economics is that 
wages paid by the modern manufacturing industry are higher than the 
marginal social cost of labor, while capital tends to be underpriced; 
together these circumstances tend to make the private profitability of 
capital-intensive projects exceed their social profitability. Most literature 
on labor markets in developing countries suggests that labor legislation 
and trade union activities are the major sources of the excess of wage 
rates above opportunity costs. In Korea there are no powerful labor 
unions or government legislation to affect wages. No thorough study of 
the Korean wage structure has been undertaken, but the apparent dif- 
ferences between rural and urban wages seem to reflect either or both 
of two things: ( 1 ) an imperfectly functioning labor market coupled with 
structural distortions; (2) the greater skill of the urban work force and 
the higher costs associated with urban living in such areas as housing, 
transportation, and public service fees. 
To the extent, therefore, that there is an identifiable factor market dis- 
tortion, it originates in government policies to encourage capital forma- 
tion, and my focus is thus upon those policies. I will first examine the 
implicit subsidies on capital use in the form of accelerated depreciation 
allowances and low prices for imported capital goods. Then I will esti- 
Table 8.13 Change in Factor Intensity of Commodity Exports Due to Factor Substitution and Shifts in Composition of Exports: 
196673 
Due to Changes in Export 
Composition 
Average 1966 1968 1970 1973 1966-68 1968-70 1970-73 
Direct factor intensity of exports (capital/labor ratios) 
2.5% -1.1% 7.1 % 
Applying 1966 coefficients 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.88 7.7% -3.6% 8.6% 
Applying 1970 coefficients 1.11 1.11 I .08 1.17 0.0% -2.7% 8.3% 
Applying 1973 coefficients 1.54 1.59 1.60 1.73 3.2% 0.6% 8.1 % 
Applying 1968 coefficients 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.90 -1.1% 1.2% 3.4% 
Due to factor substitution 1966-68 5.9% 11.5% 2.4% 7.4% 2.3 % 10.3% - - 
1968-70 27.7% 27.6% 29.1% 24.1% 30.0% - 25.6% - 
1970-73 44.5% 38.7% 43.2% 48.1% 47.9% - - 60.2% 
Direct plus indirect factor intensity o f  exports (capital/labor ratios) 
2.3% 1.2% 5.0% 
Applying 1966 coefficients I .oo 1.06 1.05 1.09 6.0% -0.9% 3.8% 
Applying 1968 coefficients 1.12 1.15 1.16 1.21 2.7% 0.9% 4.3% 
Applying 1970 coefficients 1.51 1.54 I .48 1.56 2.0% -3.9% 5.4% 
Applying 1973 coefficients 2.05 2.02 2.00 2.13 -1.5% -1.0% 6.5% 
Due to factor substitution 1966-68 10.5% 12.0% 8.5% 10.5% 11.0% 15.0% - - 
1968-70 31.3% 34.8% 33.9% 27.6% 28.9% - 28.7% - 
1970-73 34.7% 35.8% 31.2% 35.1% 36.5% - - 43.9% 
Source: Hong (1977). 
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mate the magnitude of, and interest rates on, domestic and foreign loans 
and the associated subsidies on capital use by estimating the real oppor- 
tunity cost of capital use in Korea. 
8.4.1 Accelerated Depreciation Allowances and Import Duty 
Exemptions on Capital Goods 
Since 1967, corporations in mining, fishing, or manufacturing that 
get more than half their total revenue from foreign exchange earning 
activities have been allowed an extra depreciation allowance equal to 
30 percent of the ordinary depreciation specified in the corporation tax 
law. The extra allowance is 15 percent of the basic allowance in the 
case of corporations whose foreign exchange earnings constituted 20 to 
50 percent of total revenue. An extra 20 percent depreciation allowance 
was extended, in 1970, to firms operating in specified industrial estates 
such as the Gu-Mi Electronics Industrial Estate, the Ulsan Petrochemical 
Industrial Estate, and the Chang-Won Machinery Industrial Estate. 
According to the Presidential Emergency Decree on Economic Stabili- 
zation and Growth issued on 3 August 1972, firms in specified key in- 
dustries were entitled to a special depreciation allowance of 40 to 80 
percent of the ordinary allowance during the five-year period starting in 
1972 and ending in 1976. The industries that received an 80 percent 
rate were petrochemicals, steel, nonelectrical machines, electronics, ship- 
building, and tourist hotels. Electrical machinery, nonmetallic mineral 
products, textiles, ceramics, deep-sea fishing, mining, and electricity re- 
ceived a 60 percent rate, and the chemical industry received 40 percent. 
Since 1972, those mining, fishing, construction, and manufacturing in- 
dustries not listed above have been entitled to an 80 percent special 
depreciation allowance for the portion of capital invested in domestically 
produced equipment. This provision was to be effective, even after 1976, 
for all industries. 
In the aggregate, the ratio of provisions for the consumption of fixed 
capital to gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing jumped from 
about 40 percent during 1962-71 to nearly 70 percent in 1972-76. The 
expansion of accelerated depreciation allowances in the early seventies 
in terms of degree and industry coverage must have had a very biased 
effect on investment toward the capital-intensive sectors and techniques. 
Turning to the cost of capital goods, we see that the tariff law has 
allowed duty-free imports of basic plant facilities and equipment for 
important industries since 1949. On the basis of this law, imports of 
machinery for export production received a tariff exemption from 1964 
until 1974, when the tariff exemption system was changed into a de- 
ferred payment system on an installment basis. Capital goods imported 
for foreign investment projects in Korea have also been exempted from 
tariffs since 1960. 
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During 1953-66, about one-third of gross fixed capital formation was 
in the form of electrical and nonelectrical machinery and transportation 
equipment, compared with about 40 percent for 1967 to 1975. Of this 
machinery component, according to the BOKs input-output tables, the 
import content was as high as 73 percent in 1963 and 71 percent in 1973. 
In the fifties, imports of capital goods were mostly financed by United 
States project assistance and partly by nonproject assistance. Official ex- 
change rates were applied to project assistance imports, and hence im- 
ported capital goods were underpriced to the extent that the domestic 
currency was overvalued. In the sixties, however, an increasing propor- 
tion of imports was financed with nonaid funds. In addition, repeated 
devaluations eliminated the excessive overvaluation of domestic cur- 
rency. Hence the subsidy on imported capital goods during this period 
consisted mainly of tariff exemption and subsidized financing of the im- 
ports by domestic or foreign loans. 
Since a large part of capital goods was imported duty-free for either 
export production (until 1974) , key industries, or foreign investments, 
the amount of duties actually collected on machinery imports amounted 
to only about 4 or 5 percent of the aggregate c.i.f. value during 1966-74, 
while that on electrical machinery was 8-12 percent before 1971 and 
between 3 and 4 percent after 1973. Duties actually collected on trans- 
port equipment amounted to about 7-11 percent before 1971 and 4-5 
percent after 1972. 
The absolute value of tariff exemptions per annum on capital goods 
imports was some $30 to $50 million during 1966-67, about $100 to 
$135 million during 1968-72, and about $140 to $150 million during 
1973-74 (in 1970 prices). These exemptions were equivalent to ap- 
proximately 5 percent of annual gross fixed capital formation in Korea. 
8.4.2 
During 1953-76, interest rates on bank loans (and savings) were 
usually kept extremely low compared with those on curb market loans. 
Although low interest rates raise the present value of the yield from 
real investments relative to their costs, the volume of such investments 
was necessarily restricted by credit rationing. It was this credit rationing 
that provided a financial subsidy to export production. 
Credit rationing took the form of low-interest loans, both short-term 
and long-term, given by ten specialized government-operated banks and 
five nationwide commercial banks8 Short-term loans for export financing 
were provided within the limit specified by the BOK per dollar of ex- 
ports at an interest rate of 13.8 to 9.13 percent per annum during 1960- 
63, 8.03 to 6.5 percent during 1963-67, 6 percent during 1967-73, and 
7 to 9 percent since May 1973. The financial institutions could obtain 
rediscounts from the BOK on export loans they provided for foreign- 
Allocation of Domestic Bank Credit 
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exchange-earning activities at an interest rate of 10.22 to 5.48 percent 
during 1960-63, 4.38 to 4.5 percent during 1963-64, and 3.5 percent 
since June 1964. 
Because exports have increased rapidly and steadily and because 
short-term export credit is provided automatically as a fixed proportion 
of the export value, the net annual increase in export credit has also 
expanded rapidly. The average annual increase in export credit was 
equivalent to 16 percent of the increase ‘in the money supply and 34 per- 
cent of that in bank notes issued during 1962-69. During 1970-76, 
however, these percentages rose to about 40 percent and 90 percent, 
respectively. 
According to BOK data on loans for exports, the share of such short- 
term loans in total loans provided by the Deposit Money Banks (DMB) 
and the Korea Development Bank (KDB) increased from about 3 per- 
cent in 1961-66 to about 6 or 7 percent in 1967-72 and to between 
12 and 13 percent in 1973-76. At the same time the share of long-term 
loans for export production increased from about 1 to 3 percent in 
1965-70, to between 8 and 9 percent in 1973-76. According to these 
data, loans for exports were mostly short-term in the sixties, but long- 
term loans for investment in export production began to increase rapidly 
in the early seventies, so that nearly 40 percent of loans for exports were 
long-term by the mid-seventies. The BOK data on long-term loans for ex- 
ports consisted mostly of loans by Medium Industry Bank (based on 
medium industry export promotion fund) and foreign currency loans by 
foreign exchange banks.9 However, since all DMB and KDB loans have 
been allocated among industries according to the “Regulations on Loan 
Funds,” which gave preferential treatment to export businesses, the BOK 
data do not seem to adequately approximate the “long-term” financial 
support for export production in Korea. 
8.4.3 
Faced with the prospect of declining United States grants-in-aid, the 
first serious efforts to attract foreign loans and investments were made 
in 1960. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law of 1966 allowed foreign, 
or joint, direct investment, capital and technology inducement, and for- 
eign cash borrowing. Foreign investment earnings (as well as royalty 
earnings from technology inducement) were entitled to complete exemp- 
tion from income and corporation tax for the first five years, a two-thirds 
exemption for the following two years, and a one-third exemption for 
the next year. Capital equipment imported for foreign-investment busi- 
nesses was also exempted from tariffs. Furthermore, the law granted a 
complete income tax exemption on interest earnings arising from for- 
eign loans since 1963, and no limits were placed on conversion and 
remittance of legitimate profits and dividends. The government has also 
Encouragement of Foreign Loans and Investments 
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provided guarantees of repayment and repatriation to foreign lenders 
and investors since 1962. 
Although the volume of bank loans increased greatly after the interest 
rate reform in 1965, the banks still could not meet the full demand for 
loan funds. The main long-term lending institution was the Korean Re- 
construction Bank, which depended on limited government fiscal funds 
and repayments of past loans. Private enterprises, in the absence of 
well-developed institutional arrangements for equity financing and in 
light of the shortage of funds for long-term loans and high interest rates 
on short-term funds, were very much inclined to look abroad to finance 
their capital expansion needs. The government met their demand by 
opening doors to external credit from private sources and by continuing 
to encourage private borrowing from abroad (Cole and Lyman 1971, 
p. 81). 
According to the Foreign Capital Inducement Law, the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) minister could approve foreign loans to business 
if they would contribute significantly to improving the balance of pay- 
ments position and the development of key industries, public enterprises, 
and projects specified in the economic development plan. The Korea 
Development Bank actually guaranteed the repayment in won, and the 
Bank of Korea assured convertibility of the won into foreign exchange. 
All such guarantees required the formal approval of the National Assem- 
bly until 1966. 
Approval of private loans increased rapidly after the government 
introduced a system of repayment guarantees by the commercial banks 
in 1966 that bypassed the need for review and approval by the National 
Assembly. Government repayment guarantees are limited to loans to 
large-scale key national industries, which are regarded as difficult for a 
commercial bank to guarantee. Since very little foreign borrowing could 
be arranged without a repayment guarantee, the foreign loan guarantees 
gave the government, and particularly the EPB, which assumed the main 
responsibility for approval, a means of controlling the kinds of invest- 
ment and loans being undertaken. 
The total inflow of foreign investment (on an arrival basis) to the 
end of 1976 was $0.7 billion, contrasted with cumulative foreign loans 
to that time of about $6.4 billion. As these numbers make clear, foreign 
investment was small relative to foreign borrowing. 
8.4.4 
Table 8.14 provides information on loans and real interest rates for 
1957-76. The major sources of loans in Korea were DMB loans, KDB 
loans, private and government foreign borrowing, and curb loans. The 
DMB loans constituted about 40-50 percent of total loans (as measured 
by year-end balances) during 1964-75. The share of KDB loans 
Interest Rate Subsidies on Capital Use 
Table 8.14 Loans and (Weighted Average) Real Interest Rates 
~~ 
Private Foreign Government Foreign 
Borrowing Borrowing DMB Loansa KDB Loan@ Curb Loans 
Amountb Interest Aaountb Interest Amountb Interest Amountb Interest Amountb Interest 
(Billion Rate (Billion Rate (Billion Rate (Million Rate (Million Rate 
Won) ( % I  Won) (% 1 Won) ( % I  Dollars) (%)  Dollars) (%) 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
10.9 
15.9 
18.3 
24.3 
32.7 
44.8 
49.4 
49.9 
67.1 
95.6 
168.4 
315.9 
540.4 
682.1 
865.0 
1,125.6 
1,492.8 
2,303.9 
2,75 1.6 
3,552.1 
0.1 
4.0 
-7.5 
-21.3 
6.2 
12.5 
15.4 
13.4 
13.9 
8.4 
7.8 
3.7 
7.0 
-28.1 
- 12.9 
1.6 
9.2 
10:s 
14.1 
15.9 
20.3 
24.3 
27.6 
31.7 
36.8 
46.6 
52.4 
66.4 
96.1 
129.0 
157.5 
239.1 
318.5 
425.7 
577.8 
739.0 
-1.0 
-12.3 
-26.2 
-0.8 
2.9 
6.1 
4.6 
5.4 
3.3 
3.8 
-4.1 
2.8 
-32.4 
- 15.3 
-0.8 
- 
- 
11.7 
20.4 
22.6 
38.9 
78.2 
112.1 
181.6 
218.4 
204.2 
246.4 
323.6 
408.4 
- 
- 
31.9 
27.2 
48.9 
49.8 
50.1 
47.9 
44.5 
40.6 
37.8 
25.0 
26.4 
-1.5 
14.8 
28.4 
- 
- 
2.1 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
19.8 
36.0 
60.3 
161.7 
288.7 
517.1 
829.3 
1,039.6 
1,256.2 
1,4 12.5 
1,720.5 
2,125.9 
2,766.9 
3,180.3 
2.1 
22.1 
92.1 
92.1 
-1.8 
-15.0 
35.6 
19.8 
-1.3 
-0.5 
-0.8 
3.1 
5.4 
9.5 
5.8 
2.3 
- 3 2.0 
0.0 
-5.1 
- 
- 
- 
1.1 
2.1 
8.1 
32.1 
43 .O 
53.8 
114.5 
188.1 
292.8 
433.7 
576.7 
886.6 
1,335.1 
1,790.2 
2,112.0 
2,548.2 
3,168.4 
19.9 
90.0 
-2.4 
-18.1 
32.6 
16.4 
-4.5 
-3.9 
-4.3 
- 0.4 
1.7 
6.0 
2.5 
-36.3 
-2.9 
-7.3 
-1.6 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: Real interest rates on domestic loans were computed by subtracting the rates of increase in the wholesale price index from nominal in- 
terest rates. Real interest rates on (private or government) foreign borrowing were computed by taking account of the rate of devaluation 
in Korea as well as the rate of change in the domestic wholesale price index. 
aDMB = Deposit Money Banks; KDB = Korean Development Bank. 
bLoans are amounts outstanding at end of year. 
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amounted to about 20-30 percent of total loans during 1964-66, but 
their share was reduced to about 10 percent thereafter. The share of 
foreign loans was negligible until 1962, but it has rapidly increased to 
about 30-40 percent of total outstanding loans in Korea since 1966. 
The share of curb loans, admittedly underestimated, amounted to about 
1 1  percent of total loans during 1964-71 and about 7 percent during 
1972-75.lO 
The weighted average real interest rate on DMB loans reached its 
peak of 15 percent in 1967, then steadily declined to become negative 
in 1974. The real rate on KDB loans was almost always negative ex- 
cept during 1966-71. Taking account of the devaluation effect, the real 
interest rate on private foreign borrowing was about 8 percent during 
1962-66, 3 percent during 1967-71, and -6 percent in 1972-75. The 
interest rate on foreign borrowing by the government was estimated to 
have averaged about 5 percent during 1962-66, about zero percent 
during 1967-71, and about -10 percent during 1972-75. 
To estimate the magnitude of subsidies on capital use, we need to 
have some idea of the real opportunity cost of capital use. For this pur- 
pose, I have attempted to estimate the aggregate as well as sectoral rates 
of return on capital in Korea by dividing the aggregate or incremental 
amount of national income that can be attributed to capital by the total 
or incremental stock of capital. The return on nonlabor factors in the 
business-accounting sense can indicate how much a unit of capital can 
earn in Korea under the existing pace of technical progress and scale 
economies, the average quality of entrepreneurship, the existing power 
structure among factor owners and institutional arrangements, the natural 
resource endowment, and the general business climate. Since the 
returns on nonlabor include returns on physical capital, technical 
progress, economies of scale, market imperfection, and entrepreneurship, 
what we will call the “rate of return on capital” represents the rate of 
return on all factors but labor. We presume indivisibility among these 
nonlabor factors of production. The value added may or may not include 
the depreciation allowance or indirect taxes or both depending on the 
selected estimate of the value-added/fixed-capital ratio. 
From the estimates shown in table 8.15, and using (per footnote a to 
the table) the results for the primary sector when land is included in 
total fixed capital stock, we can observe that the real rate of return 
on capital has been very high in manufacturing, relatively low in agri- 
culture and services, and lowest in the social overhead sector. Artificially 
low prices in this last sector seem to have enhanced rates of return in 
other sectors, especially in manufacturing. In any case, such marked 
differences in the rate of return on capital among sectors may explain 
the rapid expansion of manufacturing, the moderate decline in the service 
sector, and the drastic decrease in the share of GNP contributed by 
Table 8.15 Estimates of Sectoral Rates of Return on Capital. 1954-75 (Percentage) 
Ratio of Net Nonlabor Value Added to Net Capital Ratio of Gross Nonlabor Value Added to Gross Capital 
Social Social 
Annual Primarya M ~ U -  Overhead Service Primarya Manu- Overhead Service 
Average Sector facturing Sector Sector Sector facturing Sector Sector 
1954-61 
1962-66 
1967-71 
1972-75 
1954-61 
1962-66 
1967-71 
1972-75 
29 1 
292 
43 
27 
170 
153 
115 
82 
1954-61 29 1 
1962-66 292 
1967-71 43 
1972-75 27 
Applying Net Incremental 
V A / I  Ratios at Market Price 
37 9 63 
47 10 31 
62 7 28 
108 6 14 
Applying Net-VA/Net-K-Stock 
Ratios at Market Price 
24 5 10 
31 7 13 
41 7 17 
60 6 18 
Applying Net Incremental 
V A / I  Ratios at.Factor Cost 
23 6 41 
26 6 23 
38 5 19 
64 5 8 
161 
172 
31 
20 
118 
102 
77 
56 
160 
172 
31 
20 
Applying Gross Incremental 
V A / I  Ratios at Market Price 
-Type IV 
25 10 
38 12 
47 8 
54 8 
Applying Gross-VA / Gross-C-Stock 
Ratios at Market Price 
-Type 111 
18 5 
23 6 
31 7 
39 7 
Applying Gross Incremental 
V A / I  Ratios at Factor Cost 
-Type I1 
17 8 
26 10 
32 6 
36 6 
15 
14 
21 
10 
9 
10 
13 
13 
10 
11 
15 
I 
Table 8.1S-continued 
~ 
Ratio of Net Nonlabor Value Added to Net Capital Ratio of Gross Nonlabor Value Added to Gross Capital 
Social Social 
Annual Primarya Manu- Overhead Service Primarya Manu- Overhead Sector 
Average Sector facturing Sector Sector Sector facturing Sector Service 
Applying Gross- V A  / Gross-C-Stock 
Ratios at Factor Cost 
-Type I 
Applying Net-VA/Net-K-Stock 
Ratios at Market Price 
1954-61 1,701 15 4 7 118 12 3 7 
1962-66 152 19 5 9 102 15 5 7 
1967-71 115 25 5 12 77 20 6 9 
1972-75 82 26 5 12 55 26 6 9 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: V A  stands for value added, I for investment, K for net capital, and C for gross capital. The computations are made by applying non- 
labor shares in value added in 1970. See text for further details. 
aThe estimated average annual real rates of return on capital in the primary sector as shown in the table are extremely high because the 
value of land is excluded from total fixed capital stock. If land is included in total fixed capital stock, based on the Farm Household Econ- 
omy Survey data, the rate of return on capital in the primary sector would be, at most, 17 to 20 percent during 1966-73. This range in the 
rates of return is more realistic. 
374 Wontack Nong 
agriculture. It may also explain the need for government direct invest- 
ment in the social overhead sector. 
The estimated rates of return to capital based on net value added 
versus net capital (left-hand side of table 8.15) are much higher than 
those based on a nondepreciating capital assumption. Since the so-called 
allowance for consumption of fixed capital stock is a legal concept that 
does not accurately reflect the actual depreciation, the “net” investment 
figure may have grossly underestimated the real amount of capital. To 
be on the conservative side, I decided to use the estimates based on 
gross-value-added/gross-capital ratios (right-hand side of table 8.15) to 
approximate the rate of return on capital. There are four such sets of 
estimates, two including indirect taxes and two excluding them. In the 
case of manufacturing, I took the set estimated at market prices (i.e., 
including indirect taxes) and incremental ratios as a possible upper 
limit (type IV) and the set estimated at factor cost and stock ratios as 
a possible lower limit (type I) for the real opportunity cost of capital 
in the manufacturing sector. The other two sets (types I1 and 111) are 
fairly similar to each other and may be regarded as medium-level esti- 
mates for the rate of return on capital. 
Taking type I1 estimates in table 8.15 for manufacturing and type I11 
estimates for the service and social overhead sectors, I also estimated 
the weighted average rate of return on capital in all nonprimary sectors 
combined. I took the gross sectoral fixed capital stock as weights. Since 
there are many different sets of estimates for sectoral rates of return, the 
specific set selected for the computation was based on my subjective 
judgment of what may be regarded as reasonable estimates. So com- 
puted, the rate of return in Korean industries as a whole increased from 
about 1 1  percent in 1954-62 to about 15 percent in 1967-75. Con- 
sidering the estimated rate of return on capital in agriculture including 
land, it does not seem likely that the rate of return in the primary sector 
could deviate wildly from these weighted average rates of return in the 
nonprimary sectors. 
Next, I estimated the average real rates of return on fixed capital in 
manufacturing, using various methods depending upon the treatment of 
net working capital and capital loss. The results are shown in table 8.16. 
Using the type I1 estimate and taking account of capital loss, the esti- 
mated real rate of return was 12 percent in 1954-61, about 17 percent 
during the First Five-Year Plan period, 26 percent during the Second 
Five-Year Plan period, and about 27 percent during the Third Five- 
Year Plan period. This striking increase implies that the use of large 
amounts of domestic and foreign borrowed capital at low interest rates 
has yielded extremely high rates of return on equity investment in 
Korean industries. On the basis of the above estimates we can approxi- 
mate the total amount of interest rGe subsidies associated with bank 
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loans and foreign borrowings in Korea by subtracting the real (weighted 
average) interest rates on these loans from the real (average) rate of 
return on capital. 
To get some idea of the aggregate magnitude of interest subsidies, I 
estimated the ratio of the total interest subsidy associated with domestic 
and foreign loans in the manufacturing sector to the total (gross or net) 
fixed capital stock in the manufacturing sector. The results are shown 
in table 8.17. The ratio of the subsidy to net stock was about 4 percent 
on the average during 1957-61 and about 6 percent during 1962-66. 
Between 1967 and 1971 it reached approximately 14 percent, and since 
1972 it has exceeded 25 percent. The most remarkable fact is that, al- 
though the absolute amount of interest subsidies associated with foreign 
loans was negligible before 1966, after that it was equivalent to more 
than half the total amount of interest subsidies associated with KDB and 
DMB loans together. Moreover, the ratio of the interest subsidy to 
Table 8.16 Estimated Real Rates of Return on (Opportunity Cost) Capital 
Use in Manufacturing (Percentage) 
Excluding Indirect Taxes Including Indirect Taxes 
Based on Based on 
VA/C-Stock IncrementaI VA/C-Stock Incremental 
(Type 1) VA/I (Type 11) (Type 111) VA/I (Type IV) 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Annual Possible Lower Possible Upper 
Average Limit Possible Medium Range Limit 
Without Taking Account of Net Working Capital 
1954-61 13 17 17 25 
1962-66 16 26 22 37 
1967-71 20 32 31 47 
1972-75 30 42 42 57 
Taking Account of Net Working Capital 
1954-61 10 13 13 19 
1962-66 12 20 17 29 
1967-71 17 27 26 39 
1972-75 25 35 35 48 
Taking Account of Capital Loss 
1 954-6 1 9 12 12 18 
1962-66 9 17 14 26 
1967-7 1 16 26 25 38 
1972-75 17 27 27 40 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: Gross value added to gross capital ratios were used assuming nondepreciat- 
ing capital stock. The type I1 estimate might be interpreted as representing mar- 
ginal rate of return on reproducible (but nondepreciating) capital, and the type 
I11 estimate the average rate of return in manufacturing. 
Table 8.17 Estimated Rate of Interest Subsidy Associated with Domestic and Foreign Loans to the Manufacturing Sector (Millions 
of 1970 Dollars and Percentage) 
Total Fixed DMB and KDB Loans Total Foreign Borrowing 
Capital Stock 
Total Subsidy S/C S/K Total Subsidy SIC S/K 
Year Gross (C) Net (K) Loans Rate(%) (%)  (%)  Loans Rate(%) (%)  (% 1 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
972 
1,047 
1,110 
1,177 
1,243 
1,331 
1,447 
1,560 
1,718 
1,985 
2,251 
2,608 
3,013 
3,428 
3,852 
4,269 
5,036 
5,663 
6,361 
647 
697 
735 
772 
813 
869 
936 
987 
1,072 
1,273 
1,456 
1,682 
1,918 
2,138 
2,35 1 
2,458 
2,809 
2,994 
3,190 
124 
193 
236 
250 
259 
307 
257 
216 
29 1 
365 
501 
819 
1,168 
1,242 
1,437 
1,693 
2,234 
2,843 
2,743 
12 
13 
13 
13 
13 
15 
27 
40 
14 
7 
13 
14 
13 
19 
19 
24 
21 
55 
40 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
6 
2 
1 
3 
4 
5 
7 
7 
10 
9 
28 
17 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
7 
9 
4 
2 
4 
7 
8 
11 
12 
17 
17 
53 
35 
- 
- 
3 
2 
2 
5 
27 
44 
55 
156 
273 
419 
5 14 
659 
624 
963 
977 
1,037 
1,286 
- 
- 
9 
- 10 
- 80 
19 
32 
-18 
-2 
19 
27 
27 
23 
21 
16 
21 
26 
59 
27 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
-1 
0 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
11 
5 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
-1 
0 
2 
5 
7 
6 
6 
6 
8 
9 
20 
11 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Nore: S represents the amount of loans multiplied by subsidy rate; that is, the amount of interest subsidy. 
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(gross) capital stock has been steadily increasing from a moderate 3-4 
percent before 1962 to more than 14 percent during the Third Five-Year 
Plan period (1972-76). The ratio of the interest subsidy to gross fixed 
capital formation in manufacturing increased from about 40 percent dur- 
ing 1962-66 to about 75 percent during 1967-71 and to more than 100 
percent after 1972.11 
8.5 
8.5.1 Employment Growth in Korea 
As I mentioned in section 8.1, the population fourteen years old and 
over, which represents Korea’s potential labor force, increased by nearly 
50 percent from 1963 to 1976 (i.e., from 15.7 million to 22.6 million). 
During the same period, the total number of employed persons in Korea 
increased by nearly 64 percent, implying an average annual growth rate 
of about 4 percent. The total number of employed males increased by 
about 3.5 percent per annum, while the number of employed females 
increased by nearly 5 percent per annum on the average. As a result, 
the labor force participation rate of males stayed at about 74-76 per- 
cent throughout the period 1963-76, while that of females steadily in- 
creased from about 36 percent in 1963 to about 42 percent in 1976. 
Although the annual growth rate of total employment was only about 1 
percent higher than that of the total potential labor force from 1963 to 
1976, there was a rapid transfer of labor from relatively less productive 
to more productive forms of employment. Moreover, there was a sig- 
nificant rise in the absolute level of productivity in the former. 
The number of employed persons in manufacturing increased from 
0.6 million in 1963 to 2.7 million in 1976, implying an average annual 
growth rate of about 12 percent (see table 8.7). Total male employment 
in manufacturing increased by about 11 percent per annum (from 0.43 
million to 1.66 million), while female employment increased by about 14 
percent per annum (from 0.18 million to 1.02 million). The number 
of employed persons in the service and social overhead sectors increased 
by about 5.5 percent per annum (about 5 percent for males and 6 per- 
cent for females). On the other hand, employed persons in the primary 
sectors increased by only about 1.2 percent per annum (about 0.5 per- 
cent per annum for males and 2.0 percent for females) .I2 
The most noteworthy trend in employment was therefore an extremely 
rapid increase in the number of employed persons in manufacturing 
accompanied by a very slow increase in the primary sectors. Another 
important trend was the more rapid expansion in female employment 
than in male employment in every industrial sector in Korea. 
According to data from the census of manufactures, the annual real 
wage rate in m’anufacturing (in 1970 United States dollars) increased 
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from $373 in 1966 to $569 in 1971 (an average growth rate of 9 per- 
cent per annum) and to $683 in 1975 (an average growth rate of 5 
percent per annum) (see table 8.18). On the other hand, possibly owing 
to rapid capital accumulation and technical progress in the agricultural 
sector, farm income per worker increased from about $224 in 1966 to 
$352 in 1971 (average growth rate of 10 percent per annum) and to 
$447 in 1975 (average growth rate of 6 percent per annum). Hence 
one may attribute the rapid increase in the wage rate in manufacturing 
to capital accumulation in manufacturing and the associated increase 
in labor productivity that was sustained by a rising minimum wage floor 
(such as Lewis proposes) via the rising average product of farm work- 
ers. Furthermore, there was a significant decrease, especially after 1972, 
in the ratio of urban to rural earnings in Korea, as may be seen in table 
8.18. 
8.5.2 
During 1957-75, the share of loans allocated to the agricultural and 
service sectors in total loans (total KDB, DMB, and foreign loans) was 
much smaller than the share of these sectors in GNP, while the reverse 
was true of the manufacturing and social overhead sectors. On the other 
hand, the relative contributions of agriculture and the service sector to 
GNP declined, while the proportion of GNP arising from manufacturing 
increased from 9 percent in 1957 to 32 percent in 1975 and that from 
the social overhead sector rose from 3 percent in 1957 to 9 percent in 
1975 (see table 8.19). Hence one can easily detect what seems to be a 
close association between the pattern of loan allocations and shifts in 
the industrial structure. 
Among the manufacturing industries (as may also be seen in table 
8.19), the food products sector received very small loans in relation to 
its share in total manufacturing output, while the chemical sector (in- 
cluding petroleum refining and fertilizer) received a very large share of 
loans over the period 1957-75. The share of the food products sector 
in total manufacturing output declined from about 40 percent in 1957 
to about 20 percent in 1975, while that of chemicals expanded from 
about 4 percent in 1957 to about 14 percent in 1975. 
On the whole, one may conclude that there was a positive association 
between the pattern of loan allocations and the shifts in the industrial 
structure, with the exceptions of the mining sector and, to a lesser extent, 
the paper, nonmetallic mineral, basic metals, and metal products manu- 
facturing sectors. These exceptional cases are explained in terms of 
Korea’s limited mineral endowments and the extremely capital-intensive 
production techniques of these sectors. 
For exports there is a drastic fall in the share of agricultural and 
mining products and a rapid increase in the share of manufactures in 
Subsidies and Composition of Output and Trade 
Table 8.18 Differences in Urban-Rural Earnings (1970 Dollars and Percentage) 
Year 
Wage Rate in Manufacturing 
Wage Rate Ratio of 
per Worker Employee Data Labor Data Earnings 
A (dA/A) B (dB/B) C (dC/C) D (dD/D) C/A C/B 
Farm Income for Farm Census Office of Urban to Rural 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1962-66 average 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1967-71 average 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1972-76 average 
225 I-) 
256 (14%) 
255 (0%) 
218 (-15%) 
224 (3%) 
(1%) 
225 (0%) 
251 (12%) 
273 (9%) 
283 (4%) 
352 (24%) 
(10%) 
363 (3%) 
378 (4%) 
429 (13%) 
447 (4%) 
513 (15%) 
(8%)  
220 (-) 
210 (-4%) 
250 (19%) 
190 (-24%) 
170 (-10%) 
(-5%) 
200 (18%) 
230 (15%) 
260 (13%) 
270 (4%)  
300 (11%) 
(12%) 
300 (0%) 
350 (17%) 
380 (9%) 
412 (9%) 
451 (10%) 
(9% 1 
373 (-) 
405 (9%) 
449 (11%) 
495 (10%) 
532 (7%)  
569 (7%)  
(9% 1 
563 (-1%) 
635 (13%) 
632 (0%) 
683 (8%) 
( 5 %  1 
334 (-) 
308 (-8%) 
338 (10%) 
348 ( 3 % )  
(2% 1 
375 (7%) 
424 (13%) 
502 (19%) 
563 (12%) 
601 (7%) 
(12%) 
608 ( 1 % )  
617 ( 1 % )  
659 ( 7 % )  
674 (2%)  
785 (16%) 
( 5 % )  
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.9 
1.6 
1.6 
1.7 
1.5 
1.5 
2.2 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Report on the Results of Farm Household Economy Survey; Economic Planning Board, Re- 
port on Mining and Manufacturing Census (or  Survey); Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
Note: GNP deflator for all industries and the exchange rate of 310.6 won per dollar were applied to get 1970 dollar values. 
Table 8.19 Sectoral Share in Value Added, Loans, and Exports 
Loan Share 
Share in Share in vs. Value- 
Total Value Added Total Loans Added Share Share in Total Exports 
1957-75 
1957 1975 1957-75 (4) 1960 1970 1975 
Sector (1) (2) (3 )  (3) / (1)  ( 5 )  (6) (7) 
GNPa 
Total l o a d  
Total exportsc 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Mining 
Social overhead sector 
Service sector 
Manufacturing 
Total 
Food products 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Leather 
Wood products 
Paper and products 
Rubber products 
Fertilizer 
Other chemicals 
Petroleum and coal 
3,266d 
42.4% 
1.9 
1 .o 
2.9 
42.4 
9.3 
100.0% 
39.6% 
25.1 
7.1 
1.2 
3.3 
0.7 
1.5 
2.7 
0.9 
- 
13,295d 
18.6% 
3.0 
1 .o 
9.0 
36.3 
32.1 
100.0% 
20.8% 
3.3 
1.6 
1.8 
6.2 
5.7 
2,669 
7.5% 0.18% 
2.6 1.37 
2.0 2.00 
17.7 6.10 
14.9 0.35 
41.7 5.13 
100.0% 
8.7% 0.22% 
23.5 1 0.70 
4.6 1.39 
3.9 5.57 
24.4 1 4.78 
91.1d 
12.1% 
4.1 
10.9 
24.1 
22.5 
23.8 
100.0% 
24.2% 
23.7 
1.6 
1.1 
3.8 
1.1 
8.1 
5.4 
1,208.76 
2.4% 
4.2 
3.2 
12.0 
9.9 
61.Y 
100.0% 
7.3% 
26.4 
16.7 
0.4 
12.0 
0.5 
2.7 
0.8 
1.2 
3.7 
3,932.3d 
1.8% 
4.2 
0.9 
9.1 
9.5 
74.5 
100.0% 
7.4% 
12.5 
22.7 
3.8 
5.0 
0.6 
4.7 
0.0 
1.9 
2.7 
Table 8.19-continued 
Loan Share 
Share in Share in vs. Value- 
Total Value Added Total Loans Added Share Share in Total Exports 
1957-75 
1957 1975 1957-75 (4) 1960 1970 1975 
Sector (1) (2) (3)  ( 3 ) m  ( 5 )  (6) (7) 
~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ 
Nonmetallic minerals 2.5 3.7 7.4 2.96 
Basic metals 1.0 2.7 8.3 8.30 
Metal products 1.3 1.2 
Machinery 2.0 '" 1 13.7 I 1.90 
Electrical machinery 1 .o 8.9 
Transportation equipment 2.9 5.9 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7.3 5.4 5.6 0.77 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
3.2 
4.3 
0.5 
2.7d 
5.9d 
5.4d 
10.2 
100.0% 
1.3 
2.4 
1.8 
0.4 
6.2 
0.7 
16.3 
100.0% 
2.2 
5.4 
2.5 
0.9 
12.3 
4.0 
11.3 
100.0% 
~ ~~~ 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea; Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables of Korea; Hong (1977). 
aIncludes foreign sector. 
bAnnual average of total KDB, DMB, and foreign loans. 
CIncludes unclassifiable exports. 
dMillions of dollars. 
"Mostly reexports. 
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total exports during 1957-75. Among manufactured exports, the share 
of food products declined most rapidly, while that of electrical ma- 
chinery (mostly electronic products) and wearing apparel expanded 
most rapidly. There was a significant expansion in exports of metal 
products, but there was no matching expansion of their share in total 
manufacturing output, which may reflect the fact that their exports were 
heavily dependent on imported intermediate input materials such as hot 
coils for steel sheets and pipes. 
The shares of textiles and miscellaneous manufactures in total manu- 
factured exports increased significantly in the sixties. However, loans to 
these industries were not commensurate with their shares in total output. 
Their share in total exports started to decline in the seventies. The ex- 
pansion of exports of textiles, wearing apparel, and miscellaneous manu- 
factures can be attributed more to the basic comparative advantage of 
Korea (i.e., low wages) than to subsidized interest rates associated 
with bank loans. 
The share of basic metals, metal products, and electrical machinery 
sectors in total loans was relatively large, and their exports expanded 
rapidly in the early seventies. Since Korea mostly took care of the 
very labor-intensive “final-touch” (or assembling) processes, their export 
expansion may be attributed to both the low wage level and the avail- 
ability of subsidized loans. 
Although, as I noted above, the rapid expansion of the chemical 
sector’s output in the sixties may be attributed to the allocation of 
a large amount of subsidized loans, there was no matching expansion of 
the sector’s share in total exports. There was also a relatively large loan 
allocation to the nonmetallic mineral products sector, and its share in 
exports even declined. Hence the allocation of subsidized long-term 
loans to these extremely capital-intensive and inefficient sectors has con- 
tributed mostly to import substitution rather than to export expansion, 
as indicated by the rising proportion of value added in these industries 
as shown in table 8.19. 
Other industries which received a large proportion of loans are steel 
sheets and plates, chemical fibers, and ships. They are moderately 
capital-intensive products. In these industries there was not only a sub- 
stantial output expansion, but also significant increases in their export/ 
output ratios. This may be attributed to the pattern of loan allocations 
in Korea during 1957-75. Most of these sectors could not be regarded 
as major export sectors of Korea in the early seventies, and yet the ab- 
solute amount of exports of these products has significantly increased 
over the period, which surely accelerated the rising trend in capital in- 
tensity of Korea’s export commodity bundle. 
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8.5.3 
The data summarized in table 8.20 provide a basis for examining the 
association between changes in the wage/rental ratio and changes in 
the capital/labor ratio in manufacturing as well as in the entire indus- 
trial sector. Associative relationships of this type cannot, of course, be 
used as proof of causality, but the empirical relationships between 
changes in factor supplies, factor prices, and employment, in the aggre- 
gate, over time, are highly suggestive. 
During 1967-73 the real wage rate increased by about 13 percent per 
annum on the average, while the weighted average interest rates on total 
KDB, DMB, curb, and foreign loans for all industries decreased by 
about 12 percent per annum.13 This implies an average annual increase 
in the wage/rental ratio for all industries of approximately 25 percent.14 
On the other hand, fixed capital stock for all industries increased by 
about 13 percent annually during 1967-73 on the average, while the 
total number of employed persons increased by about 4 percent annually. 
This implies an average annual increase in the capital/labor ratio for 
all industries of about 9 or 10 percent and an “elasticity of factor sub- 
stitution” of about 0.4.16 
According to the manufacturing census data, the average annual 
growth rate of fixed capital stock in manufacturing was about 19 per- 
cent between 1967 and 1973. Since the total number of workers in 
manufacturing increased by about 9 percent per annum, the capital/labor 
ratio increased by about 10 percent per annum, implying an elasticity of 
substitution of approximately 0.4.16 
The numerical results outlined above clearly demonstrate that the 
wage/rental ratio rose during the period of export-oriented growth in 
Korea. A basic question, however, is whether the wage/rental ratio 
rose in response to increasing demand for labor or whether, instead, 
the rise in the wage/rental ratio precluded additional employment and 
prevented its gr0wth.l’ That the former was more likely can be seen 
from the following demonstration. Suppose that the interest rate had 
not fallen after 1967 and instead had remained at the 12.5 percent level 
for all industries during the period. Assuming that both the fixed capital 
stock for all industries and the wage rate increased by about 13 percent 
annually during this period (as they actually did) the elasticity of sub- 
stitution of 0.4 implies that employment would have had to increase by 
nearly 9 percent per annum instead of the actual 4 percent per annum. 
This implies that total employment in Korea would have increased by 
nearly 70 percent rather than 30 percent over this period, implying at 
least an additional 3.0 million extra persons employed. With this line of 
reasoning, one can go on to argue that, if the Korean government had 
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Table 8.20 Rate of Change in Wage and Rental, 1967-73 
Real Annual Wage Rate in Manufacturing 
M and M Average Real Interest 
Office of Labor Data Census Data Rate on Loans Wholesale Price Index 
Manu- Manu- 
GNP facturing GNP facturing All Manu- All Capital 
Deflator Deflator Deflator Deflator Industry facturing Commodities Goods 
(1970$) (1370$) (1970$) (1970$) ( 5 % )  (9%) (1975 = 100) (1975 = 100) 
1967 $375 $329 $405 $335 12.5% 16.2% 33.4 44.6 
1973 $617 $668 $635 $687 5.5% 8.4% 55.6 70.2 
Average annual 
percentage change 
in 1967-73 9% 13 % 8% 12% -12% - 10% 9% 8% 
Fixed Capital Stock (Million 1970 Dollars) 
(Han-BOK Data) 
M and M 
Census Data Number of Workers 
(Thousand Persons) 
All Industries Manufacturing Manufacturing 
All Manu- 
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Industries facturing 
1967 10,217 6,637 2,25 1 1,456 1,634 1,062 8,717 1,021 (649)* 
1973 21,315 14,253 5,036 2,809 4,579 3,167 11,139 1,774 (1,153)* 
Average annual 
percentage change 13% 14% 15% 12% 19% 20 % 4% 10% (10%) 
Change in 1969-75 (12%) (12%) (14%) (9%)  (19%) (20%) (4%) 10% (10%) 
Source: Hong (1977). 
Note: Figures with asterisks were obtained from the mining and manufacturing census data, which cover establishments with more than 
five workers. Other employment figures were obtained from the EPBs quarterly survey data. 
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tried to raise the weighted average interest rates on total loans to the 
manufacturing sector from 16.2 percent in 1967 to the estimated real 
rate of return on capital of about 26 percent by 1973, the real interest 
rate could have increased by about 8 percent instead of falling by 10 
percent during 1967-73. This would imply only an approximate 4 per- 
cent increase in the wage/rental ratio per annum instead of 22 percent 
(applying census data). The annual rate of employment growth would 
then have been roughly 7 percent greater than the actual rate in manu- 
facturing, using the 0.4 elasticity, implying about 50 percent more 
employment in manufacturing during 1967-73. 
That this could not have happened is evident from the facts on labor 
force participation rates and unemployment in Korea. Even the differ- 
ential in urban/rural earnings has been declining since 1970. Estimated 
unemployment rates in the early 1970s were very low-generally less 
than 5 percent of the labor force. Thus, employment has been relatively 
full in Korea since the early 1970s, and government policies that have 
affected the interest rate on loans cannot have affected the level of 
employment as significantly as demonstrated in the above numerical 
exercises. 
What, then, have been the principal effects of interest rate subsidies 
in Korea? First, Korea could have achieved “full employment” instead 
of “relatively full employment” by the early seventies if there were no 
interest subsidies. The second point is related to the optimum utiliza- 
tion of capital. My results show that Korea has oversubsidized the use 
of capital since the late 1960s (as may be seen from tables 8.15, 8.16, 
and 8.20), when the real rates of return on capital began to exceed the 
real interest rates on loans. It seems evident that, during the early period 
of the export promotion drive, new investments were primarily in the 
labor-intensive export industries and the efficiency of allocation of re- 
sources was rapidly increasing. However, with the interest rate subsidies, 
some capital-intensive investments were undertaken that probably were 
not yet economical, given Korea’s factor endowment at that time. Thus, 
although Korea’s resource allocation in the mid-1970s was undoubtedly 
more economical than it had been before the export drive started, the 
subsidies to capital encouraged the development of some industries and 
the use of some processes that were too capital-intensive. Insofar as that 
was the case, the demand for labor might have shifted upward even 
more, with a higher real wage, had the subsidies to capital been elimi- 
nated. In terms of employment, however, the narrowing wage differen- 
tials between industry and agriculture, combined with the rapid decline 
in the unemployment rate, both suggest that Korea was at, and re- 
mained at, relatively full employment during the early 1970s. 
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8.5.4 Conclusion 
Section 8.3.2 examined changes in the factor intensities of Korea’s 
exports. Their direct plus indirect capital intensity was seen in table 8.13 
to have increased during 1966-68 by 2.3 percent owing to shifts in 
export composition but also by as much as 11 percent owing to sectoral 
factor substitutions. Moving on to 1970-73, there is a further increase 
of about 5 percent in the capital intensity of exports owing to shifts 
in export composition, but a much greater change of about 35 percent 
owing to factor substitution in production processes. Some of the sectoral 
capital/labor substitution, as well as shifts in export composition, may 
be attributed to the increase in per capita capital stock in Korea and 
the associated rise in the wage/rental ratio. However, a substantial por- 
tion of the factor substitution should be attributed to the subsidy on 
capital use. 
A notable fact seems to be that in the 1960s the capital intensity of 
Korea’s exports was much lower than that of the manufacturing sector 
as a whole, but the difference between the two became smaller there- 
after, and by 1975 the former exceeded the latter. This might imply that 
factor market distortions caused by the export promotion policy were 
significantly stronger than those caused by the general industrialization 
policy characterized by extensive subsidized capital financing. We have 
already seen that employment implications of export promotion and im- 
port substitution became approximately equal since the late sixties. 
My conclusions on the employment implications of the export-led 
growth in Korea are as follows. First, there has been a continuous 
shift in employment from the farm sector to the manufacturing sector, 
as a direct result of the rapid export-led growth of manufacturing pro- 
duction. In the farm sector this has resulted in a rising real wage rate 
since about 1967 and a lessening of the difference between urban and 
rural earnings since about 1970. Second, within the manufacturing sec- 
tor, capital intensity has been increasing since the early 1960s, with the 
rate of increase at first higher in import-competing industries than in 
export industries until the early 1970s, when capital intensity began to 
rise faster in exports. This has been attributed to the higher rate of capi- 
tal subsidization in export industries, resulting in the differential increase 
in the wage/rental ratios. Thus, with this extensive capital subsidization, 
manufactured exports have not been creating as much employment as 
they otherwise would have. 
A similar conclusion is drawn with respect to the manufacturing 
sector as a whole vis-5-vis other sectors. But, overall, my results show 
that Korea began to have relatively full employment about 1970, imply- 
ing that the growth in total employment could not have been substan- 
tially higher even had the wage/rental ratios not increased as much as 
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they did. Therefore the effect of export promotion on employment in 
Korea was a rapid growth in total employment in the 1960s, a relatively 
full employment since about 1970, a change in the sectoral distribution 
of employment, and higher real wages than would otherwise have been 
possible. 
It should also be noted that deducing the employment effects of 
trade and subsidy policies in terms of employment growth does not 
provide an adequate basis for judging the overall efficiency of such 
policies. For instance, Korea’s exports might have been less capital- 
intensive if there had been no subsidy on capital use, but one might 
question whether Korea could have expanded its exports (and GNP) so 
rapidly if it had insisted upon using less capital-intensive production 
techniques. Slower growth in export earnings might also have resulted 
in slower growth of the Korean economy as a whole, thus reducing 
overall employment growth rates. 
Appendix 
Table 8.A.1 Persons Employed by Industry (Thousands) 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Labor Force. 
Social Participation 
Overhead Total Rate Unemploy- 
Primary Manu- Sector and Employed ment 
Sector facturing Services Persons Male Female Rate 
4,894 (-) 610 (-) 2,158 (-) 7,662 (-) 76.4% 36.2% 8.2% 
4,878 (0%) 637 (4%)  2,284 (6%) 7,799 (2%)  75.6% 35.4% 7.7% 
4,887 (0%) 772 (21%) 2,547 (12%) 8,206 ( 5 % )  76.6% 36.5% 7.4% 
4,956 (1%) 833 (8%) 2,634 (3%)  8,423 (3%)  76.5% 36.2% 7.1% 
4,905 (-1%) 1,021 (23%) 2,791 (6%)  8,717 (3%)  76.0% 36.8% 6.2% 
4,939 (1%) 1,232 ( 5 % )  3,243 (6%)  9,414 (3%) 76.6% 37.5% 4.8% 
4,913 (0%) 1,170 (15%) 3,072 (10%) 9,155 ( 5 % )  76.1% 38.2% 5.1% 
5,027 (2%)  1,284 (4%) 3,434 ( 6 % )  9,745 (4% ) 75.1% 38.5% 4.5% 
4,968 (-1%) 1,336 (4%)  3,762 (10%) 10,066 (3%) 74.2% 38.5% 4.5% 
5,400 (9%)  1,445 (8%)  3,714 (-1%) 10,559 ( 5 % )  74.7% 38.9% 4.5% 
5,616 (4%)  1,774 (23%) 3,749 (1%)  11,139 ( 5 % )  73.9% 40.8% 4.0% 
5,634 (0%) 2,012 (13%) 3,940 ( 5 % )  11,586 (4%) 74.8% 40.6% 4.1% 
5,485 (-3%) 2,205 (10%) 4,140 ( 5 % )  11,830 (2%)  74.5% 39.6% 4.1% 
5,666 (3%) 2,678 (21%) 4,212 (2%)  12,556 (6%) 74.6% 42.3 % 3.9% 
5,508 (-3%) 2,798 (4%)  4,623 (10%) 12,929 (3%)  75.9% 40.7% 3.8% 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey. 
Note: Figures in parentheses show percentage increase over preceding year. 
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Notes 
1. This paper summarizes my study Trade, Distortion and Employment Growth 
in Korea, undertaken while I was at the Korea Development Institute (Hong 
1977). The study was partly financed by the Council for Asian Manpower Studies. 
2. See Hong (1977) for a detailed list of these incentives. It is remarkable 
that during the Second Five-Year Plan, a time of unprecedented expansion of 
exports of labor-intensive light manufactures, the government established a legal 
foundation to promote the so-called heavy and chemical industries. The govern- 
ment introduced several laws that specified various tax-cum-financial supports for 
these industries. However, these promotion schemes were not completely imple- 
mented until the beginning of the Third Five-Year Plan period (1972-76). 
3. The trade program for imports financed with government-held foreign ex- 
change (KFX) has been prepared by the MCI. Imports financed by foreign grants 
and loans have been programmed separately by the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) in consultation with the MCI. The foreign exchange budget has been 
based on the principles of increasing capacity to repay foreign debts, expanding 
export industries, and restricting imports of nonessential goods without obstruct- 
ing the efficient supply of raw materials and goods required for stable economic 
growth. 
4. See section 8.5 for further discussion of the behavior of the wage/rental ratio. 
5. This measurement of factor requirements in relation to value of output dif- 
fers from the methodology followed in most other country studies in this volume, 
where requirements are expressed per unit of value added. 
6. Requirements of both labor and capital in exports were smaller than those 
in import-competing goods because estimates of the former include, as indirect 
inputs, only domestically produced intermediates, whereas estimates of the latter 
also include inputs of (competing) imported goods (see notes to table 8.10 and 
table 8.12). 
7. According to the Han-BOK capital stock data, net capital stock per worker 
in manufacturing increased only about 15 percent during 1966-71, then fell by 
5 percent during 1972-76, and gross capital stock per worker increased about 21 
percent over the period 1966-71 but again fell by 25 percent during 1972-76. 
According to the manufacturing census data, however, both the gross and the 
net capital stock per worker increased by about 35 percent during 1966-71 and 
further increased by 30 to 40 percent during 1972-76. The enormous differences 
between these two sets of data seem to be due to serious problems associated 
with price conversions and allowance for the consumption of capital. It seems 
that the Han-BOK data substantially underestimate the magnitude of real capital 
formation in Korean manufacturing sector throughout the period. 
8. The government is the majority stockholder in these banks. 
9. The government began to provide foreign currency loans through foreign 
exchange banks in 1967 in order to finance the importation of capital equipment 
and raw material to be used in export industries recommended by the MCI. These 
loans were also provided for import-substituting industries and for government- 
planned investment projects on the basis of the recommendation of the competent 
minister. Foreign currency loans were provided mostly with government-held for- 
eign exchange, but the branches of foreign banks stationed in Korea have also 
provided loans since 1969. 
10. In compliance with the August 3 (1972) Presidential Emergency Decree, 
40,677 enterprises reported their debts in the form of curb loans, which totaled 
345.6 billion won. 
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1 1 .  I also estimated the ratio of the total interest subsidy associated with do- 
mestic and foreign loans to total (gross or net) fixed capital stock in all industries 
in Korea (excluding ownership of dwellings). The ratio to gross or net capital 
stock increased from about 1-2 percent during 1957-66 to more than 4-5 percent 
during the Third Five-Year Plan period. The ratio of the interest subsidy to gross 
fixed capital formation increased from about 20 percent during 1962-71 to more 
than 35 percent after 1972. 
12. For further details, see appendix table 8.A.1. 
13. Since our concern is with the costs confronting manufacturers rather than 
with the real purchasing power of wage earners, I applied the implicit price de- 
flator for manufacturing output to estimate wages in 1970 prices. 
14. The wholesale price index for all commodities rose at an average annual 
rate of about 9 percent during 1967-73, and that of capital goods rose at about 8 
percent, implying a decrease in the relative price of capital goods of approximately 
1 percent per annum. Since this magnitude was rather small, I decided to ignore 
it in order to simplify the exercise. The relative price of capital goods fell sub- 
stantially only from 1974 to 1976. 
15. The so-called elasticity of substitution I computed represents a historical 
association under the given (but unidentified) pace of technological change. It 
may be regarded as a “stylized fact” that can be observed but that has yet to be 
explained by an appropriate analysis. 
16. To allow for time lags in factor substitution, I also computed the average 
annual rate of change in fixed capital stock and employment for the period 
1969-75. The results were very close to those for the period 1967-73. 
17. Of course, the wage/rental ratio and employment are simultaneously deter- 
mined. In econometric terms, the problem posed here is one of “identification”- 
whether the demand for labor (and capital) shifted in such a way as to alter the 
wage/rental ratio or whether the wage/rental ratio was altered, thereby inducing 
movements along the demand curve for factors of production. In reality, there 
must have been some aspects of both, and the argument here goes simply to the 
relative importance of each. 
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